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PREFACE 
THE IDEA 
Arrival at a suitable idea for a thesis was a factor 
of two controlling conditions. The first, of course, was 
the field of study in the graduate program at the School of 
Public Relations and Communications, Division of Public 
Relations. The second was the fact that I attended Boston 
University under an Air Force contract. This second was not 
in any sense an imposed condition, but my expectation of 
some future years in the Air Force would make the study of 
any problem other than one connected with the service useless 
to me except as a research exercise. I therefore narrowed 
the area from which to choose a thesis topic to one which 
would deal only with an Air Force problem within the area of 
Public Relations. 
The area was further narrowed for me by the knowledge 
that the retention of skilled airmen was and is one of the 
largest personnel problems of the Air Force. On the other 
hand, the cryptic "OJT Program" has long been the subject 
of a great deal of unsatisfied curiosity for me. · In the past, 
whenever any mention has been made of curious limitations to 
continued advancement of an airman in the service, the 
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tri-lettered enigma has always been brought into the picture. 
I decided to learn what OJT was and see if there could be any 
connection between it and the problem of skilled airmen re-
tention, or any other problem, for that matter, if during the 
course of research some other should turn up. Thus the sub-
ject and title of my thesis: The Public Relations Significance 
to--and Impact on--Trainees of the On-the-Job Training Program 
of the United States Air Force. 
THE PLAN 
In order to write this thesis, I had first to decide 
what plan of research and study I would follow. As I have 
said, OJT was a complete mystery to me. My first task was 
then decided for me; I had to learn all I could about OJT--
if possible, all that could be known. I had to learn its 
purpose, its administration, its organization, its content, 
its limitations. I had also to learn whether or not other 
Air Force programs or policies affect OJT in any way, and, if 
so, how. My sources for this information were any publica-
tions of the Air Force pertaining to OJT, sociological and 
psychological material validating or invalidating the prin-
ciples and practices of job trai ning, personal contact with 
officers and airmen administering the program, and personal 
contact with airmen who had been or were at the time subject 
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to the provisions of the OJT program. Sociological and psy-
chological data were also necessary on studying the retention 
problem so that causal relationships between training on the 
job and job and industry turnover figures could be found. 
Last, the findings of opinion surveys were felt to be neces-
sary. Opinion surveys conducted by the Air Force were sought 
and an opinion survey was designed by me to conduct on one 
base. 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND DECISIONS CONCERNING THEM 
In choosing a topic for a thesis, it would obviously 
be safer to choose one with a history of settled existence. 
This kind of choice would assure me of a certain minimum of 
background research material and would give me some assurance 
that upon completion of the thesis the same or nearly the 
same conditions would prevail as at the beginning of the 
study. A study of the OJT Program offers no such guarantee. 
As a formal training program it is still quite new; a large 
portion of its training publications do not yet exist. 
Changes in both its training content (because of changes in 
equipment) and its administrative rules and policies occur 
with relative frequency. Thus the possibility of early 
thesis-obsolescence was seen and considered. Against this 
consideration, however, it is fairly evident that a young 
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program still seeking direction and still in an unsettled 
state is more in need of study. The choice, then, was that 
of timelessness versus timcliness; the latter choice prevailed. 
Of great importance in making this choice was the fact that 
the newspaper, Air Force Times, was reporting weekly all ad-
ministrative changes applicable to a study of OJT and would 
therefor e help me in avoiding the production of an obsolescent 
thesis. 
CHAPTER I 
WHAT IS OJT7 
ITS DEFINITION AND PURPOSE 
Just as ves tibule training was largely the result 
of a war-born training problem duri ng the First World War , 
so also was On-the-Job Training born of such a problem 
largely during World War II. Two writers (16, p. 164) 
shortly after ~vorld 1-J'ar II discussed On-the-Job Training as 
follows: 
In contrast to vestibule, or off-the-job training, 
the new worker is assigned in this type of training to 
a machine or workplace in the shop. He is instructed 
by an experienced employee, a special instructor, or 
his supervisor. Effective on-the-job training depends 
primarily upon qualified trainers. Without them, i t 
is simply the old haphazard practice of putting new 
workers with "old hands" who may have neither the in-
clination nor the ability to teach the newcomer properly. 
With competent instruction, however, this type of 
training may be most effective for rapid training of 
large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
It was the method by which, during the Second World 
War, millions of persons, many of whom had never been 
in the labor market before, were trained to do thousands 
of different jobs in w~r plants. The value of adequate 
on-the-job~training was one of the war's greatest les-
sons in personnel administration. 
The On-the-Job Training Program of the U. S. Air Force, 
then, is largely what Pigors and Myers have reported it to be 
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most effective for, the "rapid trai ning of large numbers of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers." In some cases, however, 
the Air Force has found this method of training t o be suffi -
cient for the training of some types of ski lled workers. 
Although the wri tings of Pigors and Myers in the work quoted 
above do not support such use of this training technique, i t 
is not unsupported. Alexander Heron, in a work of rather 
broad and somewhat philosophical scope (7, p. 57), dis·cussed 
the then phenomenal success of on-the-job trai ning programs 
duri ng the Second World War. People closely acquainted with 
OJT and its results were, at first, at a loss to explain the 
high degree of success of such training. He wrote: 
But the truth dawned on the thoughtful and observant 
trainers and managers that this was actually the best way 
to do the trai~ing under any conditions. In other words, 
the best training must be part and parcel of the work 
ItSe~ The best person-to tram-a worker-rs~e-person 
who is guiding and supervising his work. The best super-
visor is one who is constantly training his fellow workers. 
The only effective training is that in which the trainee 
participates, in which he helps to train himself, whether 
he is training to be a better janitor, a better lathe 
operator, a better supervisor, or a better manager. Good 
training results in learning. Learning comes through 
doing. 
TI1e validity of this statement in this day and age is 
not questioned, but to swallow it whole as an estimate of the 
worth of On-the-Job Training would be to place every other 
method of training in an inferior position to OJT. I doubt 
that this was t he writer's intention; it would be difficult 
to find any educator or psychologist 'l;vho would claim su~ori.cy 
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for OJT for all types of skills. The Air Force regards OJT 
as an inferior method of training to formal training courses 
as can be recognized by the wording of the regulation govern-
ing OJT.(28, para. 3) 
Airman technical training requirements of the Air 
Force are met through an integrated program involving 
all Air Force commands. Some of this training can be 
effectively presented only in formal courses conducted 
or administered by a military school, whereas some can 
be presented effectively and more economically in on-
the-job training programs. 
~ihen training is not available in a formal course, 
on-the-job training will be conducted •.. 
The Air Force defines OJT thoroughly and concisely in 
the same regulation cited just above. It is: 
On-the-job training is that planned training pro-
gram designed to qualify a person, through supervised 
instruction, in the performance of the duties of a 
given AFS while he is working in a duty assignment of 
the career field ladder. The training is not on-the-
job training unless the airmen spends a portion of his 
time in a productive capacity on the job. (28, para. 2) 
The above definition will perhaps stand some clari-
fication as to terminology. AFS stands for Air Force 
Specialty; a career field is a generalized job area and the 
word ladder refers to a specific path of progression in a 
particular job from the lowest to the highest levels of pro-
ficiency. This will be dealt with more thoroughly below. 
The Air Force definition of OJT cited above includes 
qualifying phrases which differentiate OJT from the ancient 
guild system. The similarity between the two methods of 
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training is obviously broad, but there are two important dif-
ferences. The guild system prepared a man for a rather broad 
skill; OJT, on the other hand, prepares a man to perform a 
narrower range of tasks. For example, under the guild system 
a leather craftsman might train to perform all aspects and 
phases of his craft from the selection and tanning of a hide 
to an infinite and difficult variety of finished leather goods. 
Under OJT an aircraft mechanic will train to perform certain 
skills on a specific group of aircraft each one strongly sim-
ilar to the rest. Moreover, his training will not include 
skill in the care of most of the various systems incorporated 
in the aircraft; part of the work on the aircraft to which he~ 
assigned will be performed by a variety of specialists each 
of whom is qualified to perform with skill on only one or two 
specific pieces of equipment. Moreover, most of these special-
ists will have undergone a formal training course prior to 
their entrance into the OJT program. 
The second difference between the guild system and 
the OJT system is also an important one. Where the guild sys-
tem employed a method of years of sometimes haphazard exposure 
to the skill, OJT is a "planned training program. 11 (28, para. 2) 
This, too, will be discussed in detail below. 
One other comment is in order here. Some months prior 
to this writing I called on an officer closely associated with 
the OJT Program at Headquarters, USAF to obtain more information 
5 
on the program. It is, he told me, a method of keeping the 
Air Force's nose above water. Ideally, much more of the 
formal school capability of the Air Force should be used for 
upgrading airmen to the highest level of airman proficiency, 
but the high separation rate of airmen forces a far too 
great use of the facilities in training unskilled airmen 
the basic job requirements. As a result, the Air Force is 
compelled to make OJT serve purposes beyond those for which 
it should be utilized. 
THE OJT PROGRAM IN DETAIL IN THE AIR FORCE 
The complexity of the Air Force OJT Program is such 
that in order to avoid possible misstatement or error I will 
rely heavily upon direct quotations from USAF publications 
set up to describe, organize, administer, and control the 
program. 
Every airman job in the Air Force is designated by 
a five digit number. Some of these numbers are accompanied 
by either a letter prefi:x, a letter suffix, or, possibly, 
both. The first two of the five numbers designates the 
career field, e.g. if the first two digits of an airmans 
Air Force Specialty Code (the five digit number) are 25, his 
career field is associated with weather; or, if his AFSC con-
tains 31 as the first two digits, his career field is that 
of guided missiles. The third digit in the AFSC merely helps 
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to specify the job that the airman performs; it narrows the 
job down some; it is referred to as the "career f ield sub-
division. 11 A good illustration of the career field sub-
division is the differentiation between an Aerial Photographer 
and a Still Photographer: the first job is designated as a 
23150 and the second as a 23250. For the moment I will skip 
the fourth digit and go on to the fifth. This last digit, 
like the third, simply narrows the job further ; however, it 
can be understood that AFSC's which are alike except for the 
last digit represent more job similarity than AFSC's which 
are alike except for the third digit. The same is generally 
true also as between the third. and the second digits, and 
between the second and the first digits. For some specialties 
the use of the AFSC does not sufficiently narrow the job ; 
wherever this is so a letter suffix is added. For example, 
an Aircraft Mechanic is designated as a 43151; there are, 
however, a large variety of aircraft and it would be unduly 
difficult to train men to perform as aircraft mechanics equally 
well on all types of aircraft. For this reason, the job is 
further broken down and designated by letter suffixes. If the 
aircraft mechanic is trained to perform his duties on recip-
rocating engine aircraft which have no more than two engines 
he is designated a 43151A; mechanics trained to perform on 
the same type of aircraft except that they have more than two 
engines are designated 43151B's. Aircraft Mechanics trained 
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for jet aircraft are divided into three groups depending on 
whether the aircraft on which they perform have one engine, 
two engines, or over two engines, and are designated 43151C, 
43151D, and 43151E respectively. This letter suffix is 
known as a shred-out or MAFS -- Mobilization Air Force 
Specialty. This second term indicates an additional use of 
the letter suffix. Some specialties now covered by one AFSC 
might require in wartime a degree of training which time 
would not allow. In that event the job can be immediately 
broken down into its several parts and these designated by 
the letter suffixes. In such cases the Air Force would re-
tain that capability at the same time that it reduced the 
training time. Many AFSC's which do not now utilize the 
MAFS might be expected to do so in an emergency. The letter 
prefix, on the other hand, does not materially alter the 
qualifications of the man in the jo?. It is found where an 
airman is on flying status and the AFSC does not ordinarily 
include that duty. An example would be an aircraft mechanic 
in a heavy bombardment organization in which reciprocating 
engine aircraft are used; his AFSC , .. ,10uld be A43151B. 
AFSC's, then, range from the 20000's to t he 90000's ; 
this represents eight broad career areas. Some of these career 
areas are broken down into several career fields; one of them 
represents only one career field. Ther e is ample room for expan-
sion in all the .11 coded areas11 to take care of additional 
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future Air Force needs. 
I have skipped an explanation ·of the fourth digit of 
the AFSC until this point because of its essential difference 
from the other digits. At this point it is necessary to men-
tion and explain the term, "career field ladder" or 11career 
ladder" as it is variously heard • . The four digi t salready 
discussed identify precisely (sometimes with the help of a 
letter suffix) the career ladder; the fourth of the five digits 
is the one that gives the term " ladder" meaning. This fourth 
digit designates the level of proficiency of the airman holding 
the AFSC. It can be either 1, 3, 5, or 7. The "1" skill level 
is the basic airman or helper level; his grade is usually 
either Airman, Basic or Airman, Third Class. The next highest 
level of skill is the "3' ' level or the assistant or apprentice 
level; grade at this level is usually Airman, Second Class. 
Above this is the 11 511 level, the Senior Mechanic or Senior 
Specialist with a usual grade of Airman, First Class or Staff 
Sergeant. The highest airman level is the " 7i' level; this is 
the Supervisor or Technician skill level and in it are usually 
found Technical Sergeants and Master Sergeants. How progress 
is made up this ladder is best explained by quoting from an 
Air Force publication especially produced for training airmen 
as OJT Administrator-Supervisors. (29, pp.(lOl-)5-7) A pas-
sage from it follows: 
Let us trace a man through his training in the Air 
Force and see the relationship between OJT and formal 
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training, and how the Air Force expects both to function. 
We will suppose that he is an average sort of fellow, 
fairly intelligent, and t hat he has not been trained in 
civilian life to step right into one of the Air Force 
jobs. At his first stop, the induction center, he is 
poked, probed, tested, and evaluated until t he Air Force 
has a good idea of the potent~als and capabilities of 
the new airman. He will be classified a 00010, and for 
the sake of avoiding argument, we will also assume that 
he has the opportunity to either attend an Air Force 
Technical School or go to work in an Air Force job and 
be trained on the job. He considers the advantages and 
disadvantages of both. If he goes to a Technical School, 
he will receive training in the theory, principles, and 
to some extent, the practical aspect of his n ew specialty. 
Hi s training will be based on everything that he has to 
know to hold the semi-skilled AFSC that he will receive 
upon graduation, and he is receiving instruction from 
qualified individuals, whose primary job is teaching, 
along with the latest in equipment and training aids 
available. On the other hand, he has not really worked 
with the materials, except in a class room situation, 
which has its drawbacks, so he will need additional train-
ing when he graduates, to rai se his proficiency on the 
job. Now let us look at the possibility of training him 
on the job. Is he going to be behind if he did not have 
the chance to go to a formal course ~ He will have the 
practice of actually working with the materials i n a job 
situation. Possibly he will not get all the explanation 
of theory that he might need, and he is being trai ned by 
supervisors and trainers who may not be too familiar with 
formal methods of instruction. The validity and value of 
that training to the man and to the Air Force will depend 
entirely on how well • • • the OJT Supervisors carry out 
(their) end of the training responsibility. Training 
on-the-job can be every bit as valuable as formal train-
ing. In fact, you will see that OJT is the only type of 
training available for a certain part of advancement 
toward higher skill levels. 
Once a man is given a three level AFSC, he must i n -
crease hi s PROFICI~NCY to be awarded a five. Do you 
remember the definition of OJT and what it is? As the 
name implies, OJT is designed to qualify a person in the 
performance of duties in a given specialty. That is what 
the person is doing when he goes from helper level to a 
three and a three to a f i ve, and that is THE ONLY VJAY HE 
CAN GO FROM A THREE TO A FIVE. There are several ex -
. ceptions to . that; where there is no job description 
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written at the five level, or when the normal progression 
is to an AFSC with new knowledges to be learned. 
Once a man is awarded a five, he is ready to progress 
to the supervisor, or seven level, and this requires learn-
ing new knowledges, as well as improving his proficiency. 
Skills in supervision are also important here. So, once 
again, a man has a choice of attending a formal course, 
or becoming qualified by training on the job with the 
same advantages and disadvantages that he had before. 
Figure 2 (see Appendix A) is a graphic illustration of 
this progression. Of course, it must be remembered that 
some career fields require formal technical school train-
ing. (See also Appendix B) 
Some clarification of the above quotation is necessary. 
Because of the publication in which it appears and the use to 
which that publication is ordinarily put, several points in 
it are merely touched upon in passing. One such instance 
is the reference to the poking and probing of the new inductee. 
The probing is actually a battery of aptitude tes~designed to 
determine what particular career ladder or ladders the new 
inductee is best qualified for training. In addition the air-
man is interviewed and is encouraged to state his interests 
consciously, and to the skilled interviewer also does so 
unconsciously. This probing enables the classification center 
to predict whether the airman is amenable to training or not 
as well as to what particular type of training he will get. 
The nature of some airman specialties in the Air 
Force is such that formal training is an absolute necessity 
for all airmen who enter the specialty. For other specialties 
it is less important, but strongly advisable. For others, 
formal training is hardly nece.ssary at all. Recognizing this 
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fact, the Air Force has made divisions of all AFSC's along 
that line resulting in four categories labeled A, B, C and 
D. Category A specialties are those in which all airmen in 
them obtain their basic training in a formal course. Cate-
gory B specialties are those in which 65% of the airmen in 
them are trained in formal courses and the remainder in OJT 
Programs. Category C is 40% formal training and 60% OJT. 
In Category D only 10% are formally trained, 90% OJT trained. 
(27, para. 3d.) These explain the last sentence in the 
above quotation. 
Upon leaving the indoctrination and classification 
center, those airmen who have not been sent to a formal 
technical school but are qualified to go are sent to organ-
izations which require specialties which these men have shown 
aptitude for. Other airmen are also assigned to organizations 
but not to specific job assignments; these are airmen in the 
helper level whose aptitude tests and interviews showed them 
probably to be untrainable • . These probable untrainables are 
placed in needed helper positions at their organization of 
assignment. They may subsequently take tests again and may 
then be put into the OJT Program. The airmen who are as-
signed at the indoctrination and classification center to 
specific unit jobs are said to be in a directed duty assign-
ment and are placed in OJT training programs working for the 
3 skill level. 
One publication rather heavily quoted above (29, 
pp. 103-4) in a section which tells how to prepare local 
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OJT directives states, 11All permanent party airmen, assigned 
to this Base, will be considered 'in Training' in order to 
obtain a higher AFSC. 11 In the sense that any man working at 
a job is learning constantly something about it this state-
ment is certainly true. However, there are some limitations. 
Another Air Force publication (24, pp. 20-21) spells them 
out as follows: 
All apprentice-level airmen will be placed in OJT 
for the appropriate 5-level skill, provided a manning 
document authorization (not necessarily a vacancy) for 
the 5-level skill exists in the organization in whicn-
the upgrade tra~ning ~s to be conducted. Those persons 
who have demonstrated, while actually undergo~ng OJT, 
that they do not possess the ability to progress beyond 
the 3-lever-skirl are excepted. 
Up~rading to the advanced Z-level s~ill is to be 
accomp ished o~y to meet actual or proJectea-shortages. 
The projected s ortage-ii the difference between an 
approved 11Projected Authorization" and the "Projected 
Assigned. " 
Since the above passages are affirmative statements, 
I have taken the liberty of placing emphasis on the applic-
able portions which does not appear in the original. More-
over, most 7-level airmen consider themselves to be at the 
top of the career ladder and therefore no longer in training 
except to keep current. 
There would be considerable risk in making a state-
ment to the effect that I have thoroughly covered vertical 
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airman training; however, I believe I can say with assurance 
that I have described the salient features of it, and this 
brings me to a point where I can discuss horizontal traininc 0 
for airmen. 
Horizontal training, like vertical training, can be 
accomplished in the Air Force by two routes; by formal train-
ing courses conducted by Air Training Command and by OJT. 
Formal training courses are, of course, more readily adapt-
able to training from one career field to another -- where 
there is little relation between the old skill and the new. 
OJT is adaptable to horizontal training within a career field 
-- where there is great similarity between the ol d skill and 
the new. Horizontal training between career fie l ds is open 
to certain 7-level skills and for the moment to a limited 
number of 5 level skills. In some cases, where skills are 
projected to be of no further use to the Air Force, horizontal 
training is mandatory when the airman comes up for reenlistment. 
Horizontal training is provided for under OJT regulations: 
"When training is not available in a formal course, on-the-job 
training will be conducted when airmen need . . • training to 
a new AFS which is not in the airman's career ladder or for 
a different suffix to his present AFS (cross-training). 11 
(28, para 3a(4)) It should be pointed out that the sole pur-
pose of horizontal training is that of meeting Air Force 
personnel need. It is not an integral part of the airman 
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career program, but appears from time to time as a part of 
some careers because of shortages or overages in career 
fields which cannot be adequately solved by vertical train-
ing alone. Until recently, however, much of the horizontal 
training in the Air Force has been voluntary, but it has 
lately become necessary to train airmen horizontally invol-
untarily. This problem will be discussed more fully in a 
later chapter. 
It has been pointed out to me that some non-military 
readers may be interested in comparing the Air Force system 
of job classification and coding with the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles. The similarity will be apparent; the 
Air Force has classified its various jobs in much the same 
method as the DOT has for business and industry. 
CHAPTER II 
FACTORS AFFECTING AND AFFECTED BY ON THE JOB TRAINING 
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 
Each separate organization in the Air Force has 
certain tasks to perform. In order to perform those tasks, 
certain skills are needed; these skills are authorized each 
organization by assigning personnel who have those skills. 
The total personnel needed in each organization are its 
' 
authorized strength ; the total personnel assigned to meet 
its needs are its assigned strength. Authorized strength 
and assigned strength are rarely the same. 
The authorized strength of an organization is, as I 
have said, determined by the task of the organization. Once 
arrived at these personnel needs are set down in the UMD, or 
Unit Manning Document. The total authorizations of all the 
separate organizations of the Air Force are the needed 
strength of the Air Force. The personnel needs of the Air 
Force are an exact figure at any given moment, but there 
are factors acting against the establishment of a fixed 
figure. 
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Manpower needs change as the tasks of the service 
change. The addition of new weapons can increase personnel 
needs. The transfer of a task from another branch of service 
or from another department of the government can raise them. 
The obsolescence of aircraft and the phasing out of units 
employing them can decrease the personnel requirements. It 
goes without saying that manpower shifts are accomplished as 
much as possible to balance these changes but changes there 
are nevertheless. Moreover, the UMD's of the individual 
organizations are not rigidly fixed; if new methods are dis-
covered resulting in fewer needed personnel, these documents 
can be changed to reflect that savings. More efficient 
reorganization of units can and does occur ; when it does the 
new UMD's reflect various personnel changes in total author-
ization. New treaties with foreign governments can increase 
needs ; lapsed treaties can decrease them. Factors which 
cause this 11authorized" figure constantly to seek various 
levels can be imagined ad infinitum. 
"Assigned11 is the other figure in the manpower picture. 
It, too, seeks to be relatively indeterminate. Retirement 
figures are not rigidly determinable because retirement is 
not mandatory after a specified length of service, nor when 
a certain age is reached. Many airmen remain in the service 
beyond the minimum reti rement length of service of twenty 
years in order to increase their retirement benefits or for 
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a variety of other reasons. Others remain in service beyond 
thirty years despite the fact that they cannot obtain any 
more benefits -- simply because they prefer the work they are 
doing to any other work or no work at all. Statistics on 
past retirement rates can be helpful, but the factors affect-
ing the choice to retire change too, and these factors exist 
both in and out of the service. 
But the problem of personnel leaving the Air Force 
to retire is a minor one compared with that of personnel 
leaving after comparatively short lengths of service. Most 
of these airmen are those who enter the service t o serve 
their military obligation and who do not intend to remain 
in the Air Force for the duration of a career. Some who 
might otherwise remain in the Air Force find that the skills 
the Air Force has taught them can get them jobs at good wages 
in industry. Since their numbers exceed the numbers of those 
who remain to retire, the top skill levels are more readily 
manned than are the lower skill levels. The one enlistment 
airman receives valuable training, serves productively for a 
few years, and is discharged. TI1is often creates a situa-
tion in a career ladder in which the top skill level is 
either filled or over-filled while the next lower skill 
level in the ladder is in a constant state of threatened 
shortage i f not actual shortage. This occurs relatively 
frequently. Other career ladders exist in which it is 
difficult to retain airmen at any skill level. In these 
ladders, the problem is to maintain the standards of the 
skill levels and, at the same time, try to keep the ladder 
manned at all levels -- not just at the bottom rungs. 
In order to meet the problems described above the 
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Air Force maintains an inventory of skills. It knows which 
career ladders are adequately manned, over manned, or short. 
It has this information broken down by proficiency level as 
well because,as has been pointed out above, a situation can 
exist in one ladder such that the seven level is over manned, 
the five level is short, and the three level is adequate. 
This information is published by the Air Force for internal 
use and has far-reaching effects on its utilization to 
control and direct manpower commitments and needs. The fig-
ures are reached by comparing for each AFSC the number author-
ized against the number assigned. If the number assigned 
falls within a certain per cent of the number authorized in 
a certain AFSC, then the AFSC is classified as "neededn ; if 
the number assigned exceeds by a certain percentage or more 
the number authorized, then the AFSC is classified " special 
surplus" ; if the number assigned falls short of the author-
ized by a certain percentage figure, then the AFSC is classi-
fied 11 scarce. " In additi on, there is a " surplus" classifica-
tion which i s applied to AFSC's which the Air Force has 
either ceased to require or which it expects its need for 
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to cease in a short time. A further classification is often 
added; if the manning condition in the Zone of Interior dif-
fers from that overseas, this notation is added to the class-
ification. (See AFR 35-82) 
An analysis by me of the lists of five and seven level 
AFSC's in the "scarce" and " special surplus" classifications 
shows that the most critical skill level is the top or seven 
level. The number of five level AFSC's listed as " special 
surplus" is only 68.8% of the number of seven level AFSC's 
so listed. The number of five level AFSC's listed as " scarce" 
is 88.5% of the number of seven level AFSC's so listed. The 
situation is more critical than it appears by these figures 
because many of the seven levels listed are not shred-out 
AFSC's while the five level counter-part does have a shred-out 
(letter suffix). 
Controls of various kinds are used to try to alleviate 
the manpower problem situations. One control involves input 
into the career ladders affected. In career ladders which ex-
perience shortages at all proficiency levels, the action i s 
relatively simple for the lower skill levels. More airmen 
are put into training than are required by authorizations. 
This provides for the heavy rate of separation from the service 
at the beginning of the enlistment cycle. In such a situation 
there would be deliberate overages at the apprentice level (3), 
perhaps an overage in the five level, and possibl y adequate 
at the top level (or 7 level). This type of thing is in-
cluded in the Air Force regulation entitled, "Project 
Guidance. " (para. 3F, K) It is called, 11Up-grade Training 
Overages. " This is how the regulation describes it: 
Planned overages at the 3 skill level to provide 
the training lead time necessary to meet projected 
losses and/or increased requirements at the 5 and 7 
skill levels. Overages are assigned in those career 
ladders not having sufficient authorizations at the 
3 skill level to provide an adequate resource for up-
grade training to the 5 and 7 skill levels. 
20 
Since the 7 level AFSC's are generally the most 
critically short, an input sufficient only to meet adequate 
5 level requirements will probably result in continued short-
ages at the 7 level. 
Another method of relieving the shortages of personnel 
is obviously the retraining of overage skills. This is done 
in the Air Force ; however, it is done within certain fairly 
rigid limitations. Retraining in the Air Force is under-
stood to mean the training of a man presently skilled in one 
career field into another career field sufficiently removed 
from the present skill as to render his present skill useless 
in the new one. This requires formal school training and is 
therefore allowed only under certain conditions. First, of 
course, the man must be trainable, a fact determinable by 
his aptitude test scores. Second, he must now be in a career 
field which is classified 11 surplus11 or " special surplus. 11 
Third, he must have reached the 7 level of proficiency in his 
21 
present career ladder. And a sometime fourth condition is 
that he must hold certain rank or grade. These are the gen-
eral requirements; there are cases, however, in which some 
of these conditions do not exist. There are also other re-
quirements which can be placed on the possibility of retrain-
ing by intermediate commands. For example, an airman's AFSC 
may be 11surplus 11 or " special surplus" Air Force wide, but 
lfscarcei' in his own organization or on his base. In this 
event it is unlikely that an application for retraining 
would meet with approval 
Some retraining is not by application of the airman, 
not voluntary, but is mandatory. Involuntary retraining and 
cross-training (training which is accomplished through OJT 
to a skill related to the present one or of such nature that 
training can be accomplished by OJT despite dissimilarities 
between the two) is becoming more and more frequent. Air 
Force Times of 6 July 1957 · reports that Headquarters is 
ordering "connnands to focus on new overage skills and push 
cross-training into those with shortages. " The article adds 
that airmen who must retrain involuntarily must be convinced 
that " it is for their own good in the long run. 11 That the 
problem is not a small one is evident from the same story 
which points out that, "Involved are total overages of close 
to 1000 airmen and shortages of over 1500. 11 The men referred 




Aside from the fact that airmen must meet normal 
criteria for promotion such as time in grade, the attainment 
of certain proficiency levels, continued good conduct, etc., 
there are other limiting factors. In fields where overages 
exist, the situation would become aggravated should airmen 
be allowed to compete for promotions on an equal footing 
with airmen in the fields in which skills are scarce. As 
has been pointed out the higher levels are critical. Pro-
motion based on Air Force wide competition would result in 
greater and greater overages and shortages. For this reason, 
promotion for airmen in some overage skills is denied by 
11 freezing 11 promotions. Because of the difficulty in account-
ing and reporting, these freezes are large groups in a career 
field rather than by specific AFSC. The freeze on promotions 
is designed not only to stop overage fields from becoming 
even more acutely overmanned, but also to encourage airmen 
in the affected fields to train out of them. Thu s through 
retirements, discharges, deaths, and retraining it is hoped 
that the field will eventually return to normal. Nor can 
there be allowed too much time or any great degree of leniency 
on this matter since the Air Force may not promote more than 
55% of its authorized airmen into the top four grades. Quot-
ing again from the Air Force Times article cited just above: 
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The present freeze system bans promotions Air Force 
wide in whole ladders where strength is above authoriza-
tion. Roughly ohe third of all airmen ladders were 
frozen in all NCO grades for March 1 hikes. Another 
third have been frozen in one or two grades for some 
months. 
It can and does happen that a career ladder which is 
frozen in all its NCO grades will reflect shortages or 
threats of shortage in its lower levels of proficiency. Air-
men at the top of these career fields do not want to retrain 
and the overage there persists ; airmen below the 7 level can 
recognize the near impossibility of achieving the higher 
skill level and grade but cannot leave the career field be-
cause of the continuing need for their level of skill. The 
administrative career field is a good case in point. Many of 
the airmen in this field who have reached the 7 level of 
proficiency have spent 10 to 15 years in the work and are 
reluctant to leave it. On the other hand the 5 levels are 
younger, have less time in the service and in the job; they 
are more willing to retrain or cross-train some of them 
eager to do so -- but they may not because of the need to 
retain and utilize their skill level. Their outlook also 
shows them little promise: they can only go up in the 
career they're in and if they should be so fortunate to find 
a vacancy for which they can train at the 7 level and make 
it, then they will find themselves in a position where they're 
being encouraged to retrain. They may not retrain now, but 
if they are enormously successful they may later be forced 
to retrain. As a result, the attrition which should work 
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on the top-heaviness of the structure eats away at the base 
and middle of it instead, and new recruits continue to be 
trained into the career field to fill the lower skill level 
vacancies with little hope of making a career of the servi ce. 
A very serious effect of this limit to promotions 
by freezing career fields is its effect on the motivation 
on the airman to train through OJT - ~or the next higher skill 
level. An airman in a 11 scarceu AFSC whose next higher level 
is also a " scarce" AFSC can see vacancies above him which 
are likely to be filled by promotion. In such cases, he has 
attended a formal training course in his career field ladder 
and has learned enough quite often to pass not only his 
3 level tests but also his 5 level with little additi onal 
effort. TI1e comparative ease with which he will make the 
promotion tends to rob him of the motivation he might have 
had to become more proficient had he had more competition 
for the new grade. On the other hand, an airman whose next 
step up is an AFSC which is classified as 11 special surplus" 
may not even train for the next higher level if he presently 
occupies the 5 level because of the requirement that a 
vacancy exist at the 7 level in order for him to train for 
it. Often too the career field is frozen so that even the 
possibility of a 7 level vacancy opening up would make no 
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difference. He too, then, is robbed of an important motiva-
tion to improve his skill. The seriousness of this situation 
cannot be overemphasized. 
REENLISTMENT CONTROLS 
An airman considering reenlisting in the Air Force has 
two options. He may reenlist either for a period of four 
years or for a period of six years. Upon reenlistment he is 
entitled to a bonus which varies in amount according to the 
option he takes, whether it is his first, second, third, or 
fourth reenlistment, and his present pay-grade. The bonus is 
greater for the longer reenlistment period and for higher pay 
grades. It decreases as the number of reenlistments increase. 
Because of the attraction of this bonus some airmen 
take advantage of the Air Force offer to allow them to 
separate any time after half of their current enlistment has 
passed, reenlist, and collect the reenlistment bonus. Surveys 
show that reenlistment rates of first term airmen go up beyond 
the age of 25. Thus this provision induces the airmen below 
25 to remain in service long enough to be acted upon by the 
favorable rates of the higher age and length of service. This 
policy is not merely an inducement to attract reenlistments ; 
its results are contributory to decreased cost of training. 
Airmen in nscarce" and "neededn AFSC's who take advantage 
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of this offer are normally reenlisted to fill the vacancies 
they eventually would have created if they had not reenlisted. 
This inevitably cuts training costs. Airmen in " special 
surplus1' AFSC' s at the 7 level are encouraged to take ad-
vantage of the offer and apply for training into critically 
short fields through formal school facilities. nspecial 
surplus" airmen below the 7 level (some specific 5 level 
AFSC's have been authorized to apply for certain career field 
formal courses) may reenlist under this plan to train for 
another job through OJT. A recent directive message from 
Headquarters, USAF has closed this option to airmen in 
" surplus;' AFSC' s unless they reenlist for training into 
fields not listed as " surplus" and airmen in this group 
whose grade is staff sergeant or above cannot ent er any 
training leading to a seven level AFSC which is " special 
surplus. " At the present time airmen who are in a nsurplus" 
AFSC may legally reenlist at the termination of t heir nor-
mal tour of enlistment even though they may not be train-
able into a new career field. It is expected, however, 
that the eligibility criteria for reenlistment will be 
changed so as to disallow the reenlistment of unretrainable 
11 surplus" airmen. There are already in existence some 
controls over reenlistment designed to attract the wanted 
skills and discourage the unwanted ones. Airmen in short 
supply find that they can remain out of service much longer 
between enlistments without losing pay-grades. Wanted 
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airmen C'scarce11 and "needed" ) can also expect some assign-
ment preference. 
TRANSFERS 
Provision is made by regulation for the continuation 
of OJT by an airman after he has transferred. His training 
to the next higher level of proficiency is interrupted by 
transfer, but records of his training are sent along with 
his personnel records to his new assignment. It is expected 
that the new organization will take up the program where it 
was left off and continue it through to completion. Such 
delays are not of great duration, but as delays they have 
some effect on the accomplishment of OJT. 
THE NON-AVAILABILITY OF PUBLISHED TRAINING PROGRAMS 
The Program Index of the On-the-Job Training Program 
lists 533 publications each for use in training for a specific 
AFSC (32, ). These publications are listed by number, 
title, and publication date. Of this number, the index lists 
slightly over half of them as having been published. For 
most of the rest the publication date is an estimate; twenty 
of them list their estimated publication dates as " Indefinite. " 
The lack of a published program can either be a serious lack 
or an unimportant one depending on other circumstances. 
Airmen who have attended formal training courses in their 
specialties often learn their specialties well enough to 
pass the proficiency tests for the five level upon gradua-
tion. The lack of a published program for OJT for the 5 
level for dental laboratory technicians or aircraft recip-
rocating engine mechanics for example is not very serious. 
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It does become a serious lack, however, for electronics 
specialists whose jobs require them to learn to operate or 
repair equipment which has been accepted by the Air Force 
since their formal job training or equipment which is still 
in experimental stages of development and use. A good ex-
ample of this kind of lack just over a year ago was the 
situation of Air Refueling Specialists on KC-97's. At 
that time there was no publication for on-the-job training 
for their specialty and the proficiency tests which they 
were given were on the refueling equipment found on KB-29's 
which differed considerably from the equipment in general 
use. In the rapidly developing · and changing job speci alties, 
this situation is not rare. Interviews by me with the ad-
ministrative personnel of a squadron heavily committed to 
electronic research have told me that extremely able person-
nel fear t he possibility of exclusion from their career fields 
because they are examined on equipment which is outmoded and 
which they have not seen for years. 
CHAPTER III 
TilE ON THE JOB TRAINING SURVEY 
PLANNING THE SURVEY 
Dr. Nathan Maccoby made the remark recently that 
whenever he reads a report of a survey in which the writer 
claims to have planned and executed a survey such that he 
was completely satisfied with the results, that the plan 
brought out the facts that he was seeking in a way that no 
other plan could have done, then he digs in to find some 
basic faults. He added that he always found them. There 
are, he said, no perfect surveys. 
I confess it; no one need read between the lines to 
try to find the errors I have made. Were there time to 
alter my plans there are several things that I would probably 
do differently. I will discuss them fully as I come to them. 
I will begin at the beginning. 
Why did I choose to include a survey in my study of 
OJT? I had no illusions as to my ability as a feeler of 
the public pulse. The training I've received in the area 
has been good for preparation and some practical experience 
was under my belt, but I am not an expert. Surveys -- one-
man surveys -- are hard work . Research material was available 
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in adequate supply to complete a study without a survey. 
The Air Force has made a good many surveys of its own, many 
of which are available for the asking; moreover, the Air 
Force samples of opinion are conducted by experts, on far 
greater numbers than I had the means to do. 
Research material in libraries offers related sub-
ject matter, but it is only related -- it does not bear 
directly on the subject of Air Force OJT. A study of the 
Air Force publications could and did give me the necessary 
information as to what OJT is to the Air Force as it relates 
to manpower and manpower training. This view became more 
personalized through the many conversations I had with per-
sonnel officers and OJi administrators. Such conversations 
are more candid, but they are still the view of OJT as a 
manpower training device. As such, . this view did not meet 
the full requirements of the job I had set out to do -- to 
discover the Public Relations impact of the program on air-
men. And, in addition, I felt that in order to discover 
this impact as fully as possible it would be necessary for 
me to put myself vicariously in the position of the airmen 
under OJT. I chose to do the survey, then, for two reasons. 
The first and perhaps less important to me was to get answers 
to the questions I wanted to ask. The second reason was that 
I wanted to understand the answers I got as fully as I could. 
It might be objected that this amounted to emotional 
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involvement and as such would invalidate the answers I re-
ceived. Actually, the opposite is the truth. In the best 
tradition of opinion survey, I remained non-commital through-
out each interview; I interviewed in civilian clothes in 
order to try to create an illusion of complete di sinterest 
in the answers. Sometimes after the questionnaire was com-
plete the airman seemed disposed to continue to talk. It 
was during these after-talks that my second purpose in making 
the survey was accomplished. But, this was not the usual 
case. The fact that I had to identify myself as an officer 
and that the interview had official sanction made, I am sure, 
some of the airmen answer as they thought the Air Force would 
want them to answer. 
THE QUESTIONS 
Some time before writing the questionnaire, I started 
to study the various functions of OJT and to research related 
material. While doing so I made notes on the type of informa-
tion I thought I wanted to get from the survey. Needless to 
say I had to disregard some of these notes as irrelevant, 
others as not possible for a survey. Then, before I was 
ready (because of the pressure of time), I gathered my notes 
together and wrote a questionnaire. (See Appendix C) 
In pre-testing the questionnaire I found that I had 
one question (No. 4) the answer to which no one knew and one 
(No. 2) the answer to which most men thought they knew but 
some were not sure (see Appendix C). As to the second I 
had a list by means of which I could check for accuracy of 
the answer. The first, which was relatively unimportant, 
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I thought I could find the means to answer because of its 
relation to another question; however, tlie 'publication re-
lating the two was not available. A few airmen took a guess 
at it, but admitted that it was purely a guess. For that 
reason, it will be considered as unanswered throughout the 
entire sample. 
The questionnaire has been reproduced as Appendix C; 
an original copy of the questionnaire has not been placed 
in the appendix because of its non-confority with the tech-
nical requirements of the thesis. Its left margin is too 
narrow to allow binding. 
In selecting a sample the fact was considered that 
OJT is probably far down the list of items ~1ich hold air-
man interest and upon which they hold definite opinion. To 
select a sample purely at random would probably result in 
findings of such low intensity that they would scarcely have 
been worth the effort. Men below the five level of pro-
ficiency might have had so little experience under the OJT 
program that they on the average would know nothing about it. 
(A recent survey by the Air Force reported in the Personnel 
Newsletter pf May 1957 that 90% of the Air Force's airmen 
"are not aware of the OJT Package Program or any of its 
details. " ) For this reason, it was decided that only five 
33 
and seven level airmen would be included in the sample. I 
knew that the number of airmen I could interview in the time 
I had would be quite small. I hypothesized that the extreme 
attitudes and opinions on OJT would most likely fall among 
the " scarce" AFSC 1 s at one end and among the "surplus'il and 
" special surplus '' airmen at the other end. By interviewing 
five level airmen in both of these extreme positions the 
highest intensity of results should be achieved and airmen 
would be interviewed who had already had some experience 
under OJT in going from the three to the five level and who 
would most probably still be subject to OJT in the future in 
moving from the five to the seven level. In addition to 
these two groups in my sample, I determined to select a third 
group equal in numbers to each of the other two made up of 
seven level airmen from " surplus11 and "special surplus" ... <\FSC' s. 
This third group would give me a sample of opinion from men 
who had completed their vertical training (because they were 
at the seven level) and who were still subject to possible 
future OJT cross training (because they were classified as 
" surplus" and " special surplus" ). Originally, I planned 
to interview 120 airmen -- 40 in each group. I had to revise 
this figure downward to a total of 90, with 30 in each group. 
I will explain this revision later. 
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Next, the sample had to be selected. I did this by 
first making a list of all " scarce" five level AFSC's and 
all " surplus" and " special surplus11 five and seven level 
AFSC's. This list I compared with the actual manning of the 
Air Force Cambridge Research Center, and eliminated from the 
list any AFSC not assigned to the Center. Then I obtained 
the names of all the airmen assigned to the Center having 
corresponding AFSC's. This left me with the names of all 
the airmen assigned to the Center including those on location 
all over the United States who had the AFSC's I required. 
Since I had determined that the interviews were t o be con-
ducted personally, I had then to eliminate the names of all 
airmen not on duty at L.G. Hanscom Field. In the case of 
five level " surplus" and " special surplus 1' airman· the result-
. ing list "tvas so trimmed that I could not obtain 40 interviews 
in this group. Consequently, I cut the figure to thirty in 
each of the three groups. It was fortunate that this became 
necessary, because nearly a month of time was consumed in 
obtaining the lower number of intervie"tvs and tmvard the end 
i t was becoming difficult to obtain more than two or three 
interviews per day. 
The f i rst four items on the questionnaire are all of 
a part. They determine the airman's job by AFSC and title 
and classify the job according to its being over or under 
manned. The fourth item also attempts to discover what the 
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odds were on the man's having had formal technical schooling, 
but this question was the one which only a few airmen could 
guess at and to which I could obtain no check. Consequently 
no results will be recorded for it. Whether the job was 
classified " scarce, 11 ' 'surplus, " or ''special surplus ': was a 
matter of some conjecture with some. of the airmen interviewed; 
fortunately I had the means to check this answer and be cer-
tain that the correct one appears in each questionnaire. It 
is, however, interesting to note that considerable uncertainty 
existed on an item of vital importance to each individual air-
man. Most of the uncertainty existed among airmen classified 
as 11 scarce" ; however, some of the 'surplus" and " special surplus 11 
airmen exhibited some uncertainty and more than a little re-
sentment at the classification. Many of them were not aware 
of the distinction between " surplus" and 11 special surplus. 11 
The fifth question is factual in its answer. It 
attempts merely to determine whether or not the airman is 
training under OJT and if so whether that training is 
vertical or horizontal. The next three items are purely 
attitude questions about the individual's feelings toward 
OJT as he has experienced it or observed it. Question 9 
attempts to determine whether or not the man had intentions 
concerning a service career and by comparison with question 
10 to determine whether those intentions have changed during 
his service experience. Question 10 is tied in with the six 
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questions following it. If the airman answered question 10 
affirmatively, then he was asked the first three of the fol-
lowing six questions. If negatively, then he was asked the 
last three of the following six. These six questions at-
tempt to determine whether OJT has affected the airman's 
career intentions. These questions, I found, were not 
adequate to bring out clear cut findings. The responses 
to them indicated that OJT was considered only in its nar-
rowest effect, that they did not consider OJT in connection 
with frozen promotions or the fact that the particular 
career field might have been wide open for advancement. 
I do not know, however, how the questions could have been 
asked without suggesting a direction to the response in 
which case the answers would not be valid ones. Question 
17 was an attempt to determine whether aptitude f or the job 
had any relation to attitude toward the job and t raining for 
it. Airmen who held generally high scores tended to remember 
thei r scores readily. Many of the men who had no memory of 
their scores I strongly suspect did not have very hi gh scores. 
This was a question which was easily answered, 11 I don't 
remember. " When this answer was given I followed it with 
the question, "Do you remember whether you got your highest 
score in an area into which you were later trained?" . This 
was then only a partial satisfaction of the question's in-
tention. The next four questi ons a ga i n aim at factual in-
formation. Originally, I had hoped to compare t he answers 
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to number 18 with those to number 4, but my having had to 
disregard number 4 precluded this possibility. Questions 
22 and 23 are attitude questions. Question 24 is factual 
and is included to obtain ~tatistical data and for the sake 
of comparison with question 25. It had occurred to me that 
there might be more job satisfaction evident where the air-
man's formal education was related to his service job and 
that this satisfaction would increase as the amount of 
formal education increased. I hoped . that these two questions 
would render information which could be compared with ques-
tions 21 and 22 to test this hypothesis. There was one dif-
ficulty with question 24; airmen who had not completed high 
school ans\-7ered quite often that they had accomplished the 
equivalent of a high school education through General 
Educational Development Tests. \~ere this answer was given 
I made the notation "GED" beneath the grade reached in the 
equivalent tests. A few were quite candid and gave the 
number of years of school completed plus the level of the 
tests taken and passed. The next question, number 26, is 
aimed at attitude. The answer to it I intended to compare 
with the answers to 20 and 21. It was not an easy question 
for many airmen to answer. Many respondents whose answers 
reflected a great deal of time in grade in questions 20 and 
21 said that their progress had been rapid during the early 
part of their Air Force careers and very slow of late. In 
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such cases I asked the respondent to consider their progress 
throughout their career or, in other words, to average their 
times in various grades and arrive at an answer. There was 
also occasional difficulty where the airman's last previous 
grade was not the next lowest grade for the answer to ques-
tion 21; in these cases I took detailed answers. The na~t 
two questions (27 and 28) are attitudinal and contain the 
same inherent difficulty pointed out for the answers to 
questions 11 through 16. Even though question 27 relates 
promotions with OJT the respondents found it difficult and 
sometimes impossible to view the two as being related. Ques-
tion 28 was wide open, an invitation to comment f reely, but 
did not seem to encourage much soul searching. It did, how-
ever, render a variety of types of answers. All the rest 
of the questions except the last (29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34) 
are included for purposes of obtaining factual information 
for statistical reason. Only number 31 offered any difficulty. 
Its intention was to determine whether or not the airman was 
independently wealthy. It was evident to me that such a man 
would not be nearly so affected by money considerations and 
that his frame of reference would differ considerably from 
· that of most airmen. I wanted to be able to identify such an 
airman should he appear in my sample. Most airmen in spite 
of the explanatory question added after the main question 




After the list of names had been narrowed down to 
include only the names of ai~~nen who were classifiable into 
my three main. groups, names were selected at random to make 
up the sample. Thus the sample was initially and largely 
stratified where, in my opinion, it had to be; it was a .ran-
dom selection thereafter. Represented in the sample are 23 
career fields ranging from the 23 to the 98 career field. 
Altogether there are 60 different AFSC's; there is least 
duplication of AFSC's among the seven level group, most 
among the " scarce" five level group. Table I provides a 
list of the various AFSC's in the sample along with the job 
title for each and the classification of each as to 11 scarce 
(Sc), 11 " surplus (S), " and 11 special surplus (SS). " 
TABLE I 
LIST OF AFSC' S IN THE SURVEY TOGETHER WITH JOB TITLES 
AND OVER- OR UNDER-MANNED CLA.SSIFICATIONS 
AFSC JOB TITLE Sc s 
23250 Still Photographer 
23270 Still Photographer 
25270 Airborne Heather Technician 






TABLE I (continued) 
LIST OF AF SC'S IN THE SURVEY TOGETHER WITH JOB TITLES 



















Air Operations Supervisor 
Communications Center Specialist 
Cryptographic Operations Supervisor 
Radio Operations Supervisor 
Airborne Radio Operator 
Aircraft Radio Repairman, 
Radio Equip. General 
Aircraft Radio Repairman, 
Radio Navig. Equip. 
Aircraft Electronic Navig. 
Equip. Repairman 
Aircraft EW Radar Repairman APS-45 
Air Traffic Control Radar 
Repairman CPN-4 
AC&W Radar Repairman FPS-3, FPS-6 
Radio Relay Equip. Repairman, 
Micorwave 
Ground Communications Equip. 
Repairman (lt.) 
Advanced Ground Communications 
Equip. Repairman, Receivers 
Advanced Ground Conmrunications 
Equip. Repairman, RC Equip. 
Electronic Instrument Trainer 
Specialist P & Z 


















TABLE I (continued) 
LIST OF AFSC'S IN THE SURVEY TOGETHER WITH JOB TITLES 
AND OVER- OR UNDER-MANNED CLASSIFICATIONS 
AFSC JOB TITLE sc s 
36271 Automatic Central Office Equip. 
Technician 
36351A Cryptographic Equip. Oper. and 
Off. Line X 
42152 Aircraft Hydraulic Repairman '\T i \. 
42250 Instrument Repairman X 
42350 Aircraft Electronic Repairman X 
43151A Aircraft Mechanic, Reciprocating, 
1 or 2 Engines X 
A43151B Aircraft Mechanic, Reciprocating, 
over 2 Engines X 
43151C Aircraft Mechanic, Jet, One Engine X 
43250 Jet Engine Mechanic X 
43251 Reciprocating Engine Mechanic X 
46250 Weapons Mechanic X 
46270 Weapons Maintenance Technician 
47170 Vehicle Maintenance Technician 
47250 Ground Powered and Support Equip. 
Repairman X 
56550 Heating Specialist 
58170 Parachute and Fabric Supervisor 
60370 Motor Transport Supervisor 









TABLE I (continued) 
LIST OF AFSC'S IN THE SURVEY TOGETHER WITH JOB TITLES 
























Food Service Supervisor 
Meat Cutter 
Warehousing Supervisor 
Supply Inspection Technician 
Organization Supply Supervisor 
Supply Records Supervisor 
Stock Control Technician 
Sales Store Supervisor 





Ground Safety Supervisor 
Special Services Supervisor 
Air Police Supervisor 
Medical Services Specialist 
(concluded on next page) 



















TABLE I (concluded) 
LIST OF AFSC'S IN THE SURVEY TOGETHER WITH JOB TITLES 
AND OVER- OR UNDER-MANNED CLASSIFICATIONS 
AFSC JOB TITLE sc s 
90270 Medical Services Technician 
90350 Radiology Specialist 
90670 Medical Administrative Supervisor 
98170 Dental Technician 








The sixty AFSC's listed above are by no means an ex-
haustive list of the AFSC's in which the Air Force is experi-
encing overages or shortages. The list from which selections 
were made was necessarily shortened to include those airmen 
at L.G. Hanscom Field, Bedford, Massachusetts who held AFSC's 
listed in the larger list. Theoretically, it would have been 
possible to cover 221 AFSC's had there been no time and 
geographical limitations in making the survey. Hence, the 
survey represents 27.15% of the possible sample field. Most 
of the results of the survey have been compressed into six 
tables brought together under Appendix D. This appendix will 
be the basis for some discussion of the survey in this 
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chapter and for tables of data which will appear in the body 
of this chapter. Some broad description of the resultant 
sample is necessary before a discussion of the attitude 
findings can be attacked. Tables II, III, IV, and V below 
will sketch in broad terms the respondents interviewed as to 
their grade distribution, reenlistment intentions, and the 














BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENT AIRMEN BY GRADE 
AND BY AFSC CLASSIFICATION 
5 level 
Total Percent 7 level scarce 
5 5.6 5 0 
14 15.6 14 0 
37 4-1.1 11 14 
31 34.4 0 15 
3 3.3 0 1 











REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS OF 7 LEVEL AIRMEN IN 
SPECIAL SURPLUS AFSC'S, BY GRADE 
Total Intend to Reenlist Do Not In tend to Ree:ilist 
5 4 1 
14 12 2 
11 11 0 
30 27 (90%) 3 (10%) 
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TABLE IV 
REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS OF 5 LEVEL AIRMEN IN SCARCE AFSC'S, 
BY GRADE 
Grade Total Intend to Reenlist Do Not Intend to Reaili.s t 
S/Sgt. 14 12 2 
A/lC. 15 10 5 
A/2C. 1 0 1 
Totals 30 22 (7 3. 3%) 8 (26 . 7%) 
TABLE V 
REENLIS'IMENT INTENTIONS OF 5 LEVEL AIRMEN IN SURPLUS AND 




















A comparison of the results in Tables IV and V by a 
Z test and a·Chi square test shows respectively a .028 and 
approximately a .05 possibility of obtaining such results by 
chance alone. Such results are not as satisfactory as I 
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would like them to be, but their relative significance is of 
sufficient importance to warrant attention when coupled with 
other factors which will be brought out shortly. For the 
moment, however, i t is important to point out the amazing 
degree to which the two five level groups resemble each 
other in composition. The following table demonstrates some 
of the more obvious statistical data similarity quite well. 
TABLE VI 
















LJ. . L~33 
Data 
Enlistment Number Totals 
Average Enlistment Number 
Total Years Service 





Total Number Dependents 
Dependents per Man 
Number Who Attended AF School 
Number in OJT Now 
















LJ. . 333 
From the above table the reader may see and j udge the 
degree of success in selecting at random a reasonably valid 
sample in spite of the great amount of stratification 
L:-7 
necessary at the beginning. There is, of course, no other 
group with which to compare the seven level group as the two 
five level groups are compared in Table VI, but internal 
evidence within the group itself would seem to validate it. 
Thus the low number of airmen in that group planning not to 
reenlist is supported by the years service figures. Those 
planning not to reenlist have sufficient time to retire 
shortly; the average number of years of service of the three 
planning not_ to reenlist is 16 2/3 years with a low of 15 
years ; the high man of those planning to reenlist is 19~ and 
second to him i s a man with 16 years. In this respect and 
others the findings in the seven level group are probable. 
It is at this point that I regret not having had the 
foresight to alter my survey plans. Information obtai ned 
by interviews of the seven level group offers important in-
sight into the thesis problem, but the importance relative 
to the five level groups is less. For this reason, larger 
five level groups at the expense of the seven level group 
altogether would have been preferable -- even though this 
would have required my conducting the survey on two bases 
instead of one in order to obtain the necessary numbers for 
the two groups. There would have been an additional ad-
vantage to this alternative. By increasing the size of the 
two five level groups, I could have subjected the results 
to statistical tests and obtained more than an intuitive 
understanding of the significance of the results. As it is 
the numbers involved are too small to subject successfully 
to these tests. A check has been made on several sets of 
comparative figures taken from the results of the f i ve 
level questionnaires to determine whether Z tests and chi 
square tests could render conclusive the data under study. 
Unfortunately, they do not. The tests result in figures 
showing significance to between 5 to 10 per cent. A further 
check using the same proportions in larger numbers shows 
that the alternative plan, if my foresight had been as good 
as my hindsight, would have rendered the resulting data sig-
nificant to within two per cent in most cases. 
On the other hand, I do not feel that my work has 
thus been invalidated. So many comparisons point in one 
direction (even though each single comparisonwill not stand 
alone as significant) that their total must be taken by me 
as conclusive. In the following pages I will reproduce 
those figures in short tables as evidence to support my 
convictions. 
But, f i rst, I would like to call the attention of the 
reader to some iternsin Table VI above. This table was in-
serted to demonstrate the similarity between the two five 
level groups. I would, however, like to point out something 
in that table which, at the same time, both emphasizes the 
similarity and points out a basic difference between the 
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two groups. There are four sets of figures in the table to 
which I would invite the attention of the reader: the aver-
age enlistment number, the average years of service, the 
average age, and the average grade. The second and third 
of these items are expressed in years. It should be noted 
that the difference between the two average ages is approxi-
mately the same as the difference between the average years 
service figures. In one sense this demonstrates an even 
closer similarity between the two groups for it shows that 
their average ages at the time of their initial enlistment 
was almost identical. But it also points to a v i tal differ-
ence, if you compare these two figures with the average en-
listment number and the average grade code. The average 
grades of the two groups is nearly the same with the scarce 
group having a slight edge. The surplus group has a slight 
edge in comparing the number of enlistments because they are 
older. This means that in spite of the great similarity 
between the two groups there is concrete evidence that the 
airmen in the scarce group progress more rapidly in grade 
(and, consequently, in pay) than the surplus group. Both 
groups have progressed approximately equally in grade (with 
the scarce having such edge as there is), but the surplus 
group is older and has reenlisted more by the additional 
amount of time it required them to arrive at the same point. 
These figures deserve to be looked at in detail and are 
so 
consequently reproduced as Table VII, emphasizing another as-
pect of time spent -- time in grade. 
TABLE VII 
A COMPARISON OF THE TIME IN GRADE FIGURES (AVERAGE) 
AND THE ENLISTMENT NUMBERS (AVERAGE) 
OF THE Tt-10 FIVE LEVEL GROUPS 
Time in Months in Grade Average 
Present Previous Total Enlistment 
Grade Grade Number 
Scarce, Not Re-
enlisting 11.1 7.8 18 1.375 
Surplus, Not Re-
enlisting 16.8 16 .4 33.3 1.5 
Scarce, Reenlisting 15.4 18. 6 34.0 1.95 
Surplus, Reenlisting 27.3 16 .5 43.8 2.57 
Both Scarce Above 14.3 15.5 29.7 1.8 
Both Surplus Above 21.7 16 .5 38.2 2 .0 
Both, Not Re-
enlisting 15 13.2 24 1.45 
Both, Reenlisting 20 17.8 37.8 2.19 
But, one might ask, how aware is the average airman 
of his own time in grade in comparison with that of other 
airmen? And if he is aware, how does this awareness affect 
him? In the survey, airmen were asked whether they thought 
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promotions had come either faster or slower to them than to 
other airmen. Of the ninety asked, forty-six answered. 
Seventeen thought promotions had been faster; twenty-nine 
thought promotions had come slower. Table VIII shows the 
distribution of these answers and offers a comparison by 
grade and by group. (See Table VIII on page 52) 
It should be noted in Table VIII that in every 
column but one the number of airmen who estimate their promo-
tions to have been slower than for other airmen is greater 
than the number who thought their promotions to have come 
faster. The one exception, a significant one, is the 5 scarce, 
will reenlist column. This fact should be considered in the 
light of the difference in the percentage of 5 scarce airmen 
intending to reenlist and the 5 surplus airmen intending to 
reenlist. (See Tables IV and V above.) The concept operating 
here apparently is that a wanted airman and one who feels that 
he is getting ahead faster is the airman who reenlists. This 
factor, though continuing to operate throughout the airman's 
career, becomes a less important factor as increased age and 
years of service become a more important one. (Compare the 
7 level columns in Table VIII with the percentage of 7 level 
airmen intending to reenlist in Table III above.) In search-
ing for a reason for the large number of airmen who consider 
their promotions to have been slower and who in spite of that 
elect to reenlist, I found that age and time in service seem 
TABLE VIII 
ESTIMATES OF AIHMEN AS TO HHETHER THEY TIIOUGHT PROMOTIONS WERE FASTER OR SLOWER 
THAN FOR OTHER AIRMEN, BY GRADE, BY REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS, BY SKILL LEVEL, 
AND BY GROUP 
7 Level 5 Surplus 5 Scarce Total 
Grade Reen. Not Reen. Reen. Not Rem. Reen. Not Reen Reen. Not Reen. 
M/Sgt. 2-F 1-S 2-F 1-S 
T/Sgt. 2-F 2-F 
5-S 5-S 
S/Sgt. 1-F 1-F 3-F 1-F 5-F 
7-S 3-S 3-S 13-S 
A/lC 1-F 2-F 4-F 5-F 2-F 
1-S 3-S 3-S 2-S 4-S 5-S 
A/2C 
1-S 1-S 
Totals 5-F 2-F 2-F 7-F 1-F 14-F 3-F 
12-S 1-S 4-S 4-S 6-S 2-S 22-S 7-S 
- -17 1 6 6 13 3 36 10 
18 12 16 46 
Note: F : Faster, s Slower Vl - N 
-
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to have been effective in the seven level group and to some 
extent in the others wherever the airman is sligh tly older 
than airmen of the same grade. In addition I noted that a 
high percentage of 5 and 7 level surplus and special surplus 
airmen who rated OJT as less effective than a formal class-
room course in the same subjects also felt that their promo-
tions had come to them more slowly than for other men. Or, 
in other words, among the 5 and 7 level surplus airmen who 
intend to reenlist and who thought their promotions were slow 
are 61.5% of all reenlisting airmen who thought OJT less 
effective than a formal classroom course in the same subject. 
For purposes of comparison it should be noted that among the 
surplus reenlisting airmen who thought their promotions slow, 
those who rated OJT equally effective represent only 37.5% 
of the number possible; and those in this category who rated 
OJT more effective account for only 11.9% of the total. 
Speculation as to the cause of this phenomenon would lead to 
an infinite number of possible answers. It is sufficient to 
note the phenomenon and recognize it as another instance of 
Public Relations impact through the interaction or inter-
connection of OJT and airman career progress. 
The question naturally arises, What of the accuracy 
of the airman estimates of promotion progress ? Is the air-
man who complains that his promotions are slower just a 
chr onic 11 bitcher, " or is he giving a sober and accurate ffitio:ate 
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of his promotion situation? The question can be reasonably 
answered by comparing the estimates of airmen wi t h the time 
in grade situations of themselves and the rest of their 
relatively homogeneous group. There are limitations. The 
questionnaire includes answers on time in grade for the 
present grade and the last lower grade only. Thus the higher 
the grade of the airman the less these two figures would 
represent adequately the promotion situation of the airmen 
involved. These comparisons have been made and appear in 
Appendix E. They tend to show that airman promotions time 
estimates are, for the most part, accurate. 
One previously unsuspected feature of the survey was 
the low number of airmen who answered that they were cur-
rently in OJT. Only 18 out of 90 made that answer. Three of 
those who said they were in OJT were seven level airmen and 
one of the three replied that he is in vertical training for 
the grade of Warrant Officer. The other two are Staff 
Sergeants in cross-training (horizontal). The eighteen a i r-
men divide themselves by type of training with 11 in vertical 
training and 7 in horizontal training. Of the eleven in 
vertical training, nine plan to reenlist while only three 
of the seven in horizontal training plan to reenlist. If 
these proportions hold true Air Force wide, there can be lit-
tle doubt that the horizontal training under OJT has serious 
effects on the reenlistment rate. A closer look at this 
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situation is provided in Tables I X and X by providing in 
these tables a comparison of the training situations with 
estimates of the airmen involved as to their speed of promo-
tion, their estimates of the effect of OJT on ease or dif-
ficulty in getting promotions, and their statements as to 
whether they consider their jobs those for which they are 
best qualified and which they desire most to be doing. 
TABLE IX 
ELEVEN AIRMEN IN VERTICAL OJT COMPARING ESTIMATES OF SPEED 
. OF PROMOTION, EFFECT OF OJT ON EASE OF PROMOTION AND FIT-
NESS FOR THE JOB ACCORDING TO JOB QUALIFICATION AND JOB 
DESIRABILITY, BY GRADE, BY NUMBER IN GROUP, BY SKILL 
LEVEL AND GROUP, AND BY REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS 
Speed In Best In Most Ef£. of 
o£, Qual. Desir. OJT 
Airmen Prom. Job Job on Prom. 
Seven Level 
Reenlisting 
T/Sgt. (30) s y y NA 
Fi ve Scarce 
Reenlisting 
S/Sgt.(l4) M y y NA 
S/Sgt. (19) M y y NA 
S/ Sgt.(21) s y y NA 
A/lC. (13) F y y E 
A/lC. (23) M y N H 
Five Scarce 
Not Reenlisting 
S/Sgt. (12) F y N E 
(concluded on next page) 
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TABLE I X (concluded) 
ELEVEN AIRMEN IN VERTICAL OJT COMPARING ESTIMATES OF SPEED 
OF PROMOTION, EFFECT OF OJT ON EASE OF PROMOTION AND FIT-
NESS FOR THE JOB ACCORDING TO JOB QUALIFICATION AND JOB 
DESIRABILITY, BY GRADE, BY NU}ffiER IN GROUP, BY SKILL 
LEVEL AND GROUP, AND BY REENLIS'IMENT INTENTIONS 
Speed In Best In Most Eff. of 
of Qual. Desir. OJT 
Airmen Prom. Job Job on Prom. 
Five Surplus 
Not Reenlisting 
S/ Sgt. (11) M y y NA 
Five Surplus 
Reenlisting 
S/Sgt. (1) s y y H 
S/ Sgt. (7) s y N NA 
A/lC. (10) M y y NA 
Reenlisting 4-S 9-Y 7-Y 6-NA 
t1.-M 2-N 2-H 
1-F 1-E 
Not Reenlisting 1-F 2-Y i-Y 1-NA 
1-M 1-N 1-E 
Scarce 2-F 6-Y 4-Y 3-NA 
3-M 2-N 2-E 
1-S 1-H 
Surplus 3-S 5-Y 4-Y L:--NA 
2-M 1-N 1-H 
Notes: S = Slower; F =Faster ; M =Same as others ;· y =Yes; 
N = No ; E =· Easier ; H = Harder; NA = No answer 
It will be noticed that there is no particular pattern 
of discontent implied in the answers in Table IX. In compar-
ing the reenlisting with the not reenlisting airman, no 
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difference in job and promotion attitude is detectable. I n 
a similar comparison between the scarce and surplus groups 
there is a detectable difference only in estimates of speed 
of promotion -- a difference which is relatively meaningless. 
On the other hand, the results of Table X show a more marked 
difference. That table follows: 
TABLE X 
SEVEN AIRMEN IN HORIZONTAL OJT COMPARING ESTIMATES OF SPEED 
OF PROMOTION, EFFECT OF OJT ON EASE OF PROMOTION AND 
FITNESS FOR THE JOB ACCORDING TO JOB QUALIFICATION 
AND JOB DESIRABILITY, BY GRADE, BY N~ffiER IN 
GROUP , BY SKILL LEVEL AND GROUP , AND BY 
REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS 
Speed In Best In Most 
of Qual. Desir. 
Airmen Prom. Job Job 
Seven Level 
Reenlisting 
S/Sgt. (1) s N N 
S/ Sgt. (13) s N y 
Five Scarce 
Reenlisting 
S/ Sgt. (9) M y y 
Five Scarce 
Not Reenlisting 
A/lC (5) M y y 
Fi ve Surplus 
Not Reenlisti ng 
A/lC (13) s y y 
A/lC (21) M N N 
A/lC ( 22) M N N 
(concluded on next page) 











TABLE X (concluded) 
SEVEN AIP~N IN HORIZONTAL OJT COMPARING ESTIMATES OF SPEED 
OF PROMOTION, EFFECT OF OJT ON EAST OF PROMOTION AND 
FITNESS FOR THE JOB ACCORDING TO JOB QUALIFICATION 
AND JOB DESIRABILITY, BY GRADE, BY NUMBER IN 
GROUP , BY SKILL LEVEL Al:\TD GROUP , AND BY 
REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS 
Speed In Best In Most 
of Qual. Desir. 
Airmen Prom. Job Job 
Reenlisting 2-S 2-N 1-N 
1-M 1-Y 2-Y 
Not Reenlisting 1-S 2-N 2-N 
3-M 2-Y 2-Y 
Scarce 2-M 2-Y 2-Y 
Surplus 3-S 4-N 3-N 
2-M 1-Y 2-Y 











Notes: S = Slower; F = Faster ; M = Same as others; Y = Yes; 
N = No; E = Easier; H = Harder; HA = No answer. 
It will be noted that the answers given by the surplus 
group is changed for the worse from the answers that group 
gave in Table IX. Moreover, the difference between surplus 
and scarce groups is a marked one in Table X, much more so 
than in Table IX. 
But what of the large number of airmen not presently 
being trained in OJT? A tally of the reasons given by airmen 
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for not being in training boils down to a manageable table. 
The airmen in seven level spots all gave the same answer, 
that they were at the top of the career ladder and that no 
OJT existed to go any farther. Those who were not at the 
top of the career grade ladder could do nothing about it 
OJT-wise. The two five level groups gave ten different, but 
sometimes closely related, answers which are the subject of 
Table XI. 
TABLE XI 
REASONS GIVEN BY FIVE LEVEL AIRMEN FOR NOT PRESENTLY 
BEING IN OJT PROGP~S 
Reasons 
No Seven Level Vacancies 
Must Go To 7 Level School ; Not 
Authorized To Apply In ~resent 
Assignment 
May Not Go Higher Until Promoted 
Program Not Yet Set Up In Section 
No Authorization For Seven Levels 
Here 
No Authorization for Seven Levels 
Except Civilians Here 
Career Field Frozen 
No Facilities For Training 
Must Go To School For Seven Level 
Have Completed 7 Level But Not 






































The above table will bear some comment. " No Seven 
Level Vacancies 11 and "May Not Go Higher Until Promoted" ac-
count for about two thirds of the airmen not now in OJT. 
The distribution of airmen from the two groups is about 
equally divided on these two reasons, and these are restric-
tions which will eventually be taken care of through attri-
tion. It is to be expected that it will be taken care of 
more quickly for the airmen in the scarce group. The last 
reason listed is completely different from the rest in that 
the two men in it have not met with a restriction to train-
ing. ~vo other reasons given are definitely of a temporary 
nature; one is the fact that no program has yet been set up 
in one man's section and the other is that facilities do not 
presently exist for one man's training. The fact that 
they are of a temporary nature is encouraging to an ob-
server, but little comfort to an ambitious airman. The 
frozen career field situation is ostensibly a temporary 
situation also, but in some career fields this has become 
almost permanent with obvious consequences to available top 
level spots to train for. 
The remainder of the reasons are built in, permanent 
restrictions to further training. They are, of course, neces-
sary manpower policies in the present personnel scheme of 
things. But they are a source of career frustration to the 
airmen who happen to run into them. A great many airmen like 
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their jobs and prefer to remain in them in hopes that advance-
ment opportunities will continue to exist or will soon again 
open up. But there are some who would be willing to change 
jobs when met with a manpower impasse or who simply prefer a 
different job. Although the question was a·sked airmen whether 
they consider the jobs they are now doing the jobs which 
they desire most, another related question was asked --
whether the airman wanted to OJT for another job in the future. 
Sixty-two airmen answered either yes or no to the question and 
some made some comment. The yes-no answers are compiled in 
Table XII just below and the more lengthy comments are quoted 
in Appendix F. 
TABLE II 
ANSvJERS TO THE QUESTION, "DO YOU WANT TO OJT FOR ANOTHER 
OCCUPATION AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE? '~~ 











Total N - 39 
Yes 
No 
This result represents a higher proportion of men 
who want to change jobs at some future date than the number 
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who said they were not in their most desired jobs. The dif-
ference percentage-wise is the difference between 3ll% and 
26.6%. A tendency to answer questions in the affirmative 
where possible is not unnatural to military men and could 
account for the disparity. Moreover, as the comments repro-
duced in Appendix F will show, many men are very near the 
dividing line between yes and no answers to these questions 
and the dividing line for them is quite a narrow one. The 
appendix will also show that some men have done some serious 
thinking on the subject of job change. Many know the specific 
skill they want to train for, and others have contemplated a 
change in order to get around impediments to career progres~ 
Another question relates to the above two under dis-
cussion. It is number 15 which ask s airmen who have ex-
pressed intentions not to reenlist whether they i ntend to 
work or obtain further education related to their present 
service jobs. Of the 27 airmen intending not to reenlist 
all but one answered thi ,s question. The result ~vas seventeen 
affirmative answers, thirteen of which fell among the sixteen 
5 level surplus group airmen. Among the scarce skills at the 
five level which are so often the skills lost to industry, 
there were more negative answers than positive ones. It may 
be wise then to look for other causes for loss of skilled 
.I 
airmen than the readily identifiable one of industry's lure. 
The answers to questions 11 and 14 (alternative 
questions) are for the most part straight-forward "No's" . 
The affirmative answers, however, contain some additional 
comment and so are included in Appendix G. The attitudes 
expressed there are as varied as their jobs; they are both 
pro and con ; both general and specific ; and they represent 
one in five of the survey sample. There is also a great 
variety of opinion and attitude expressed in the answers 
to question number 35 -- "Any other comments on OJT?". 
This, too, is too large to include here and so will be 
treated as Appendix H. 
Some questions have not been treated at all. 
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Question 12 is ridiculous; the answer is obviously 1'no 11 if 
you have already reached the seven level (except to keep 
current) and"yes" if you have not reached the seven level. 
Question 16 is equally bad; it requires the man to separate 
his OJT from his Technical School training to answer the 
question which he wouldn't have to do to get the job. And 
question 28 turned out to have been redundant. Answers 
there appeared also elsewhere in the questionnaire. Thus 
nothing will be reported on the results of these three. 
No more will be said here concerning the survey. It 
will, however, be the subject of more consideration in the 
final chapter on conclusions and recommendations. 
CHAPTER IV 
RELATED PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL DATA 
The U. S. Air Force is not merely a military machine ; 
it is a structured society still young, but born ful l 
grown and fully capable from a rib of the U.S. Army. As a 
soci al structure its degree of success in performing its 
function is dependent on the strength and continued mai nten-
ance of that structure. In static times social structures 
wear well and are easi ly maintained ; in times of rapid 
change social structures need more maintenance to prevent 
crumbling. The mechanization and specialization of industry 
i s a case in point. Taylorism, or scientific management, 
has been properly criticized as unscientific for it treated 
men as though they were a commodity or a machine and did not 
scientifically consider the whole man. Specialization and 
mechanization robbed men of t heir high skills and left them 
only seniority as a basis for accepting positions of higher 
authority. The industrial structure showed signs of crumb-
ling in many studied communities, and the shaky position of 
foremen in industry today is largely traceable to the struc-
tural failure of industrial society due to modernizati on. 
65 
The Air Force has always required a high degree of 
mechanization and the rate is increasing rapidly. Higher and 
higher degrees of specialization of personnel are meeting the 
mechanization requirements. The process is the same that 
industry has been going through for the past fifty years; . 
and the problems which the Air Force will encounter are or 
have been the same ones that industry has met. And, perhaps 
inevitably, the pitfalls will be the same. But a great deal 
of industry's troubles are behind them; many studies have 
been made of industry's growth pains and illnesses; much is 
known now about handling these problems which industry did 
not know at the time. It would be folly not to profit by 
the experience and knowledge amassed by and about industry 
if there is a possibility of its helping the Air Force to 
avoid some of the pitfalls. 
One of the great, broad problems involved is the 
internal public relations problem within which lies the 
functions of human relations, industrial psychology, and 
industrial sociology. Within this context are problems of 
management, organization, authority and leadership, morale, 
status, social distance, incentives, fatigue and boredom, 
motivation and frustration, and all the various behavior 
patterns which are symptomatic of personnel trouble a-brewing. 
Mechanization begat specialization ; specialization 
begets efficiency by splintering the tasks and shortening 
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the previously lengthy gestation period of training. But 
specialization begets a number of unwanted and unwelcome 
children as well and they are the black sheep of their gener-
ation. Among them are high turnover and absenteeism rates, 
high mobility of the labor force (aided by the advancements 
in communications and. transportation), mushrooming growth 
of organizations accompanied by increased insulation of de-
partments and sections, boredom, psychological fatigue, 
loss of individuality and status, decreased sense of per-
sonal achievement, inability to identify organization goals 
with personal goals, less chance of personal recognition for 
merit, increased obsession with personal problems, breakdown 
of clear lines of authority through effective superior-
subordinate relationshi ps. Obviously, not all of these 
problems and symptoms of problems can show up in a military 
organization because of its very nature. But it is true 
that where such symptoms are inhibited, others become more 
intensely acute. For example in a study of turnover and 
absenteeism in 1951 (10, p. 55), it was reported that de-
partments experiencing high turnover rates also experienced 
low rates of unexcused absenteeism. The work situations 
were highly regimented in these cases so that the authors 
of the report believed the turnover rate was the result of 
strict policy regarding absenteeism. 
Among the activities that the Air Force has in com-
mon wi th industry is that of training its personnel in 
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particular, on-the-job training. This type of training i s 
closely allied with the job such that things which affect 
the job and the indiv~dual in it also affect the individual 
through the training program; and, indirectly or directly, 
they affect the training itself. Thus, manpower policies 
and promotion policies are often tied directly to the train-
ing program ; this is true in the Air Force. Therefore, in 
making a study of OJT it was necessary not only to study the 
effects of training but also to study the various activities 
associated with or a part of the training program. For this 
reason, a great deal of research time has been spent on 
promotions plans and policies. Because horizontal training 
in industry is often accomplished through interdepartmental 
transfers this aspect has also received study. 
Tne Hawthorne Studies have shown, among other things, 
that a great many workers are simply not able to be objective 
in viewing their own problem situations. For this reason, 
it is not possible to depend entirely (for a study of such 
problems) on what the people affected have to say about the 
effect. It is possible, however, to study behavior patterns 
and statistical studies based on behavior with great assurance. 
For purposes of this thesis this means that some lcnowledge 
of the behavior patterns of industrial workers can apply 
equally to military personnel to the extent that conditions 
are similar. It also means that behavior patterns which are 
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symptomatic of specific conditions can wherever found indicate 
there the presence of the same specific conditions. This is 
the basis of the research here of labor mobility, turnover 
rates and causes, absenteeism, status, morale studies, motiv-
ation and frustration inwork contexts, and a lesser variety 
of sociological and psychological concepts. 
TRAINING 
Training is obviously the place to begin this sec-
tion of the thesis. The rest will follow in what I hope will 
be recognized as a logical order. There is no need to go 
into the detailed production ends which a training program 
meets. They are obviously and simply to enable men to per-
form the separate technical functions which together meet 
the task the organization wants to accomplish. \~at we are 
interested in here is training from a personnel viewpoint --
not what to teach them to do, but how to teach them in such 
a way that they soon become efficient, that they remain 
efficient, that they remain with the organization, and that 
they become more valuable to the organization the longer they 
remain with it. This starts with a good induction and train-
ing program. Two eminent authors (and experts on the subject) 
have made a rather good pronouncement on what they consider 
to be a good induction and training program as follows: (15, 
p. 158) 
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What can a good program accomplish? First, through 
induction, the new employee is given information about 
the organization, its policies and regulations. This 
should be done in such a way as to help him feel at 
home quickly. Second, the new employee is instructed 
in the requirements of the specific job that he is to 
perform, so that he can as rapidly as possible meet 
the standards for quantity and quality production and 
thus increase his earnings. 
Third, training enables present employees to acquire 
more and greater skills, thus increasing their versatil-
ity for transfers and their qualifications for promotions. 
Fourth, if employees are properly trained, ·accidents, 
spoiled work, and damage to machines and equipment are 
reduced. Fifth, training helps employees to adjust to 
new methods and processes that are introduced from time 
to time. Finally, good training re4uces dissatisfaction, 
absenteeism, and turnover, because it helps both new 
and experienced employees to use to the full their 
individual capacities. 
It would appear that the Air Force had the advice of 
these two men when it set up its induction and training pro-
gram. Its program certainly has the intentions of a program 
such as that described above. It is questionable, however, 
whether an organization as large as the Air Force and which 
monopolizes so much of the inductee's life can adequately 
make him " feel at home. " And it is the rare airman who 
while remaining in a rigid career ladder can increase his 
versatility through a wide acquisition of skills. But the 
Air Force along with business and industry has realized that 
it can no longer "proceed on the premise that it is entirely 
up to each employee to qualify himself for advancement. Such 
an assumption would base on the erratic foundation of indi-
vidual initiative the vital function of providing qualified 
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men to fill vacancies. " (9, p. 285) 
So the Air Force provides a dual training facility. 
One part is the school system through which the majority of 
airmen pass; and the other is the OJT program which provides 
qualified men to fill the vacancies above them in their 
career lad4er. This dual system provides the necessary man-
power to man all its various jobs and job levels barring 
temporary overages and shortages. The system does not re-
quire any great amount of versatility from its airmen, but 
there is reason to believe that a number of airmen require 
the satisfaction of achieving versatility. In a study of 
the attitudes and output of employees (11, pp. 641 f 648). 
Likert and Seashore report that: 
TI1e lesson of World War II on training so many 
diverse people into so many diverse occupations and 
tasks proved that it is no longer possible to think 
of the labor force as composed of static occupational 
categories. The individual as a unit of manpower must 
be regarded as a highly versatile and adaptable unit 
with a potential productive contribution far exceeding 
his present contribution. 
The Air Force is not alone in its disregard of this 
aspect of worker ability. Business and industry likewise 
have considered this aspect of workers too costly to develop, 
too difficult to control. The authors of the above quotation 
have more to say on the subject. 
Much of the work in industry and business is be-
coming inherently uninteresting. This trend is based 
upon the demonstrated advantages of specialization 
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and the logical proposition that more routine tasks can 
be performed with greater ease and with a les$er in-
vestment in training, planning, and supervision. It 
ignores the possibility that the gain in potential ef-
ficiency may in some cases be more than offset by a loss 
in employee motivation and satisfaction. Many questions 
have been raised about the effects which follow the dilu-
tion of skill requirements and the increased routineness 
of jobs, but the scientific testing of the optimum 
simplification in relation to the maintenance of job 
interest, satisfactions, and motivation to produce has 
progressed beyond a beginning. 
The results obtained in a large clerical organization 
are representative. Employees tended to have a high 
degree of satisfaction with the job itself if the skill 
demands were high, if the job permitted a variety of 
unlike activities, and if the job (or the way it was 
supervised) permitted the employee to feel t hat he could 
make some decisions about how the work was to be done. 
Also important was the relation of the job to the employee's 
skill level; high satisfaction accompanied the feeling 
that the job made full use of abilities and skills. It 
is important to note, however, that not all employees had 
aspirations or needs for more complex and more demanding 
work; many were content with routine work and did not 
respond unfavorably to a high degree of work simplifica-
tion. 
High motivation at work will be obtained through 
improvement of the immediate job situation of each 
employee rather than through the direct impact of broader, 
impersonal policies and programs. 
There are numerous expressions of plans to accomplish 
versatility for the man and for the organization. A variety 
of methods are used in business and industry for various 
reasons. One such passage appears in the Personnel Handbook 
edited by John F. Mee (13, pp. 1002-4) 
• • . it is sometimes difficult to convince the 
lower line supervisors in costs, production, sales, 
merchandising, personnel, and so on, that they are 
all playing on the same team and striving for the 
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identical goal. As a partial solution to this problem, 
supervisors are sometimes deliberately injected into 
the jobs which normally are handled by other depart-
ments. 
This type of training is spoken of in the same section 
of the book as "Planned Job Rotation. " The discussion of it 
is excerpted: 
Job rotation is the movement of supervisors from one 
position to another for development purposes. This device 
capitalizes upon experience as a learning opportunity. 
Usually men are carefully selected for the rotation. 
Their strengths and weaknesses are inventoried and a pro-
gram of job exchanges is worked out so that they get oppor-
tunities to exercise the skills they have and develop those 
they lack. Usually the rotation takes the men into areas 
somewhat different from those wherein they are most exper-
ienced, although drawing the man away from his specialty 
is usually accomplished in gradual steps. 
Sometimes the stops are as brief 'as a day or two in 
a job; sometimes as long as a year in one capacity. \~ere 
orientation to the operations is all that is necessary, 
visits may be brief. Where it is expected that the indi-
vidual will learn to handle the operations by himself, 
or to supervise those who do so, more time is, of course, 
required. 
Excellent as rotation is, it raises problems; the 
most important one being that not all men take to it 
well. Change, uprooting, and new experience are not as 
satisfying to middle-aged and successful* people as are 
*I would qualify this author's use of 11 successfuln 
in this context with the adverb " relatively. 11 
routine, security, and repetition. Men have to be sold 
on rotation: they have to be encouraged to participate. 
This process will be easier if the program is carefully 
worked out and well supervised. There will be better 
response if there are evidences that the new skills and 
broadened experiences are to be used within the company. 
Another author (44, p. 353) in writing of various 
types of transfers has this to say about recent need for 
transfer: 
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In recent years, increasing attention has been given 
to the use of transfers to maintain employee interest 
and overcome monotony. \ . J'ith increasing division of 
labor and specialization, many jobs have attained a 
simplicity that may become highly monotonous and, for 
that reason, objectionable to certain types of workers. 
One means of allaying such dissatisfaction is the fre-
quent use of transfers. 
At the same time this author (44, p. 353) recognizes 
the potential harm in using transfers arbitrarily merely as 
a means of manpower adjustments without the understanding 
of the worker involved. He suggests transfers be systematic. 
• • • Their purpose is to remove transfers from the 
comparatively irregular and unpredictable position they 
generally occupy and to define the conditions under which 
employees may expect to be asked to transfer or to have 
their requests for transfer approved. Managerial policy 
with respect to transfers in the past has generally not 
been carefully explained, and the conditions under which 
transfers are or are not to be granted have frequently 
been a matter of speculation among employees. 
In another study called "Job and Institutional 
Consequences of Technological Change" (14, pp. 320-321) the 
author tells of the psychological difficulties which may 
arise due to forced transfers. What he has to say is as 
true for involuntary transfers in general as it is for the 
specific situation about which he is writing. The difficulty 
will arise whenever the transfer appears to be the result of 
the individual's holding a skill or job which the organization 
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no longer requires and the organization conducts the transfer 
in such a way as to imply that it is a salvage operation. 
This is the passage: 
Workers, like executives, seek some measure of control 
over their day-by-day lives. Changes imposed upon them 
without their prior knowledge and consent are regarded 
as a threat to their well-being in much the same fashion 
as they are by the businessmen subjected to the vicissi-
tudes of the market or to what they consider '11unpredictable 
decisions 11 by 'those bureaucrats in t.Jashington. ' Not 
uncommonly, the worker's stake in the decision has been 
conscientiously and realistically neglected by a manage-
ment installing labor saving technology in an effort to 
maintain or improve the competitive situation of the firm. 
It has been observed that an environment of uncertainty, 
fear, and hostility may be skillfully created by quicken-
ing the pace pf unpresaged changes in technology. 
Through the enforced obsolescence of skills, labor 
saving technology produces acute psychOTogical and social 
problems for the worker. The difficulty does not lie 
exclusively in the need for learning new routines of 
work. The need for discarding acquired skills, and, 
often, the accompanying demotion of status destroy the 
positive self-image of the worker, stemming from the 
confident use of those skills. 
A mere surface reading of the above secti on on train-
ing (and including job transfer as a part of trai ning) might 
lead one to believe that I am arguing both for and against 
job changes. Nothing could be further from the truth. Job 
changes are an absolute necessity from an organization's 
standpoint, especially if that organization is highly mechan-
ized and rapidly changing in technology. Fitting i n well 
with this requirement is the need of many workers to develop 
their potential versatility in order to prevent dissatisfac-
tion with the work through monotony, insulation and narrowed 
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scope of the organization, and eventual loss of ambition. 
The potentially versatile worker is the potentially valuable 
worker to the organization ; that versatility is t he founda-
tion of supervisor capability. But I am arguing against 
forced, involuntary job changes handled in such a way as to 
discourage the worker. These can do more harm than requiring 
a versatile man to remain for a career in one rigidly defined 
specialty. For this reason, job changes should be systematic 
and the system should be widely understood by the workers 
who are subject to it. At the same time that the job change 
program is systematized there should be flexibility in it. 
The versatility of each worker will have some direction and 
for that reason the flexibility of the system should include 
an elective feature which would allow broadening in the 
direction of the bent of the worker while it fulfills at 
the same time the manpower needs of the organization. 
But it has been amply demonstrated above that some 
workers have no desire to broaden their skills, that they are 
not potentially versatile. Such men are necessary to the 
continued life of the organization, but they are not the 
stuff of leadership and supervision. They may attain more 
valuable proficiency in their particular, narrow skill and 
so become more valuable to the organization and happy in it. 
A systematic job change program flexible enough to allow 
some election by the worker will soon enable the organization 
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to identify its perennial workers and distinguish them from 
its potential supervisors. In this way not only the best 
interests of the organization are served; but, from a human 
relations standpoint, the damaging psychological aspects of 
job situations are nullified. 
PROMOTION 
Promotion and training are often tied very closely 
together; this is certainly true in the training and promo-
tion of airmen in the Air Force. This being so, a discussion 
of promotions follows logically one of training. 
The age old conflict between ability and seniority is 
well known. No genuine solution to the conflict has been 
reached, and I do not intend to attempt one here. The 
compromise between them is a question to be settled by each 
individual organization predicated on a balance of values 
assigned to each by the organization or by the organization 
in conjunction with the labor union. Perhaps, in some cases, 
an organization may be able to assign quantitative values to 
the two and come out with a workable system. Such weighted 
systems are in use; I will not burden myself or the reader 
with a discussion of them. They are not a question here ex-
cept that both criteria must be recognized as legitimate. 
There are other aspects to promotion which are of 
importance here and will be discussed. Two authors quoted 
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earlier are called upon again here. (16 , p. 177) 
In addition to emphasis on ability and decisions 
on seniority, there are other elements of a sound 
promotion policy. The personnel administrator should 
bring these to the attention of top management in 
policy formulation and to the attention ·of line manage-
ment in policy administration. A few of these elements 
are 
1. A statement of management's intention that 
higher paid and better jobs will be filled by 
advancement from inside the organization. Ob-
viously, the statement will be worthless if it 
is not faithfully practiced. 
2. Encouragement for supervisors to permit capable 
employees to leave the department or plant if 
better opportunities are available elsewhere. 
If a good man is held back, he is not likely to 
remain a satisfied employee. 
3. Establish lines of progression -- ladders of 
promotion -- within the organization. It is 
desirable to use job analysis to develop a 
chart showing basic job requirements (in 
ability, experience, formal education, etc.) 
and how each job leads to another. Employees 
need to know what is expected of them on higher 
rated jobs in order to prepare themselves for 
advancement. 
4. Line responsibility for making promotions, 
with the advice and assitance of the personnel 
department in a staff capacity. The super-
visor should initiate promotions, which should 
then be subject to approval by his immediate 
superior in the line organization. This 
serves as a check on the fairness of promo-
tions and ensures that the policy will be 
consistently administered. Joint responsibil-
ity of management and the union, however, is 
neither wise nor a workable procedure. 
5. Provision for employee or union challenge of 
a particular promotion, "tvithin limits of the 
promotion policy and the union agreement. 
Some firms have taken the position that 
:t.questions as to the correctness of management's 
78 
selection will be heard by management but will 
not be arbitrable.' \..Jhere management has dem-
onstrated its fairness over a considerable 
period, it may be possible to secure this type 
of provision in union negotiations, but ordin-
arily a management that has consistently adhered 
to a sound promotion policy should have little 
to fear from a commitment to arbitrate grievances 
about promotions. 
Passages in the above citation referring to unions 
and their voice in promotions have been included purposely 
in the quotation -- not because excluding them would have 
chopped up the passage. The union, of course, is not a part 
of the Air Force promotion picture, but the sort of thing 
the union represents in its view of promotions can be taken 
at least as a partial view of airmen toward promotions. Air-
men generally support promotion based on seniority and at 
times see cause for viewing some promotions as unjustified. 
Recognition of these facts is not without value in promo-
tion policies. 
Nevertheless, promotions should not be viewed either 
by the policy making levels or by the airmen subject to the 
policy merely as justification and reward for seniority or 
merit and ability. The purpose of promotions includes these 
considerations, but not exclusively. A noted expert has ex-
pressed the purpose of promotions quite forcefully; he lends 
me support. (4-4, pp. 344-345) 
In most cases, promotion is not, however, a means 
merely of rewarding employees, but is, at the same time, 
a means of placing employees in positions where they 
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are more valuable to management. It seeks to fill 
positions effectively by selection from withi n the 
ranks of present employees. It is an adjustment cal-
culated to increase the value of personnel to manage-
ment. It reduces labor turnover in so doing and, in 
many instances, solves problems of training by provid-
ing instruction on the job for higher positions to 
which workers may be promoted. 
In the aggregate, frequent, well-selected promotions 
tend to maintain and improve the morale of the whole 
working force. They. demonstrate management's interest 
in employees and its intention to provide for their 
advancement, and they thereby forestall much unrest 
and labor turnover. It will be apparent, of course, 
that if unwise promotions are general, if favoritism 
and preference are obvious in promotional programs, 
desirable results will be less notable, and dissatis-
faction and frequent separations are likely to be un-
avoidable. 
In the previous section of this chapter, I discussed 
(with the expert assitance of several authors on the subject) 
the question of job changes predicated on the necessity of 
offering a flexible system of identifying and training 
workers who are versatile for supervisory positions. Such 
a plan would, of course, have to be tied in with a systematic 
promotion plan. There are three general promotion plans 
extant ; the three position plan, the multiple chain promo-
tion plan, and the seniority plan. The Air Force uses a 
combination of the first and third of these three. From time 
to time, to meet manpower maladjustments, the Air Force di-
rects through Project Guidance an element in the second of 
the three which is missing from the other two. For an ade-
quate description of the three plans I am again depending 
on the authoritative work of Mr. Yoder. (44, pp. 348-350) 
Specific plans for systematic promotional arrange-
ments are almost as numerous as are the firms having 
such plans. They vary in detail rather than in prin-
ciple however, for there are many similarities in all 
plans. Most of them represent adaptations of two 
older, well-established arrangements. One of these, 
usually credited to the Gilbreths, is called the 
11 three position plan." It involves an arrangement 
in which each position is related to one from which 
workers are promoted and to another to which promo-
tions are made. There are three levels of attainment 
for each position, that of the student, that of the 
instructor, and that of the actual worker at that 
task. Each employee passes through three stages on 
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each job. He begins it as a student. He achieves the 
status of a journeyman, or a full-fledged worker, after 
which he may be called upon, when an opportunity appears, 
to become an instructor. From the point of view of the 
worker, he looks always at three positions, the one he 
has most recently left, the one he occupies, and the 
one toward which he is headed. While the plan is not 
widely used in the exact form in which its originators 
described it, it is highly suggestive of modificati ons 
that more closely fit the requirements of individual 
industries and business concerns. 
The other of the two best known plans is what is 
known as the 'multiple chain promotion plan.' It 
derives that name from the fact that it provides for a 
systematic linking of each position to several others 
from which promotions are made and to still others to 
which incumbents may be promoted. Obviously, its 
chief distinction is that it provides for greater flex-
ibility than is possible under the three position plan. 
It permits multiple promotional opportunities through 
clearly defined avenues of approach to and exit from 
each position in the organization. Each such avenue 
is pre-arranged, and all are clearly indicated in the 
general chart of the whole systematic promotional plan. 
Moreover, each job may be described to its incumbent 
in terms of a number of avenues leading toward several 
superior positions. 
What might be described as a third standardized 
system of promotions is the recognition of seniority 
as a basis for advancement. In such arrangements, the 
eldest incumbent in each position is given preference 
whenever an opportunity for advancement appears. The 
syst:em is always coupled with some restrictions upon 
the types of employees eligible for promotion into 
each higher position and is well illustrated by the 
procedure followed on most railroads in the United 
States. It has been a long established feature, also, 
of c:ertain phases of civil service in this country, 
and it is enforced, with exceptions, in the peace-time 
military and naval services of the nation. 
The seniority system, although much criticized and 
properly ridiculed, has certain advan.tages and merits. 
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The fact that an employee has been satisfactory through-
out an extended period of service is in itself some 
evidence of value, since most highly unsatisfactory 
workers will be weeded out in such long service. 
Seniority unquestionably reduces labor turnover. Fur-
theimore, such qualities as dependability and persistence 
may be effectively evaluated, and the long service re-
quired permits workers to accumulate information with 
respect to the business as a whole that may be desirable 
in some fields. In general, the system encourages a 
feeling of security of tenure on the part of the employee 
that has shown desirable reflections in morale and loyalty. 
Mr. Yoder goes on to discuss the limitations (major 
and minor) to any type of systematic promotion plan. His 
work appeared before Mr. Cordiner made his study, but it 
would almost appear that he is taking the service's v i ewpoint 
in his comments on limitations to systematic plans. (44, p. 351) 
The two major limitations affecting any systematic 
promotion plan are thus the restricted number of ad-
vanced positions and the lack of desire for advancement 
that characterizes certain types of personnel. There 
are, however, other minor limitations. Established 
precedent and tradition frequently make it difficult to 
open logical lines of advancement or to close those for 
which no genuine justification can be established. 
Short-sighted budget control may force employees to 
seek promotion outside the organization in spite of 
obvious future needs for the types of personalit i es and 
ab i liti es thus lost. Many employers cannot see that a 
given candidate for promotion is likely to be worth as 
much to t hem as to their competitors, with the result 
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that numerous shrewd managements make a regular practice 
of 'stealing' the fully trained recruits after they have 
taken advantage of excellent training and experimental 
provisions of other concerns. In some instanc~ senior-
ity systems effectively limit all efforts at provisions 
for any other inclusive promotional system. 
TURNOVER AND ASSOCIATED CAUSES 
Far more important than as a cause of demoralization 
among workers is the turnover as a symptom of demorali za-
tion which exists for other reasons. 
These words were written over 35 years ago by 
Mr. Sumner Slichter in what is sti ll considered a monumental 
and authoritative work on the subject of factory labor turn-
over. (20, p. 181) Thus he identified the general cause of 
turnover. But the demoralization about which he writes here 
can have a number of causes. In this study I am confined to 
causes which are associated with the job and job traini ng. 
Mr. Slichter, in covering this aspect of the cause of turn-
over producing demoralization, had this to say: (20 , pp. 187-
188) 
Because of the intimate relationship between men's 
interest in their work and their stability i t is im-
portant to know what powers modern factory work possesses 
to win the interest and attachment of the workers. 
Five principal characteristics seem most important 
in interesting men in work. They are : 
1. More or less variety. The same thing contin-
uously soon becomes tiresome physically and 
mentally. 
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2. An element of the unexpected, the unknown. To 
know with absolute certainty what is coming next 
is dull. The love for the new, the unknown, is 
universal; it is part of the spirit of adventure 
which all men possess in large or small degree. 
Too much uncertainty is disagreeable, particularly 
to timid natures, but normal men enjoy an element 
of the unexpected. 
3. The opportunity to exercise initiative, ingenuity, 
to decide for oneself how to do things rather 
than have the decisions made for one. It seems 
an inherent trait in human nature to enjoy having 
one's resourcefulness appealed to. Problems 
in themselves exert a fascination. The process 
of unraveling them and the sense of achievement 
which comes with success is pleasurable. 
4. The ability to see a fairly definite prospect 
of advancing by merit to better paying or more 
attractive work. 
5. The opportunity to feel pride in one's work and 
to win the respect and esteem of other men. 
The insight Mr. Slichter displays in the above passage 
is amazing considering the time in which it was written. A 
great deal of work has been done on the problem since 
Mr. Slichter wrote his book; a great deal more must yet be 
done. But some of the statistical data obtained on the sub-
ject is of value, and several of the studies have corroborated 
most of what Mr. Slichter had to say on the subject in 1921. 
Mr. R.J. Young in an article published in Pe~~onnel 
(47, p.78) noted that " turnover is usually found to be much 
greater in large groups than in small ones. ' ' Large groups, 
of course, are much less likely to offer the kind of thing 
Mr. Slichter has pointed out as necessary to employee 
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stability. This same point was confirmed by Kerr, Koppelmeier, 
and Sullivan in a study referred to previously. This tudy 
of groups of workers in separate departments from records 
was a correlation of eighteen variables. The results are 
quoted briefly here. (10, p. 55.) 
High turnover departments tend to be characterized by 
(a) many employees, (b) low unexcused absenteeism, ·k 
(c) low vacation absenteeism* (one year of service is 
*The term 11unexcused absenteeism" implies here that 
absenteeism is strictly controlled by a system of excuses 
upon application either in writing .or verbally. Thus unex-
cused absenteeism would be such absenteeism as the organiza-
tion could not so control. The term "vacation absenteeism" 
should not be taken to mean that some vacation right is 
recognized and other not and not that this term applies to 
the latter. It means merely that paid vacations which are 
earned are minimal in these deparaments. 
mLnLmum requirement for one week of vacation), (d) high 
degree of incentive work, and (e) little opportunity 
for conversation. • • • Low unexcused absenteeism pos-
sibly is symptomatic of highly regimented work situa-
tions from which many persons regularly escape through 
turnover .... employees in incentive work situations 
are more disposed to quit their jobs ••.. Most strik-
ing . . . is the significant tendency for departments 
with minimal conversation opportunities to experience 
highest turnover rates. 
Factory Management and Maintenance in an article 
on "What Makes Low Turnover11 reported the result of a ques-
tionnaire sent out to nine companies which had very low 
turnover rates. It asked the companies to tell whether 
certain conditions thought to be conducive of low turnover 
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rates existed in each individual company. Of course, the 
results of such a survey cannot be considered as conclusive 
until the list of such conditions is complete and accurate. 
According to this survey the condition found to be most 
important was "harmonious labor relations" and second in 
importance was ll scientific recruitment, training, and place-
ment. 11 It would be difficult to relate the importance of the 
first with the Air Force, but the second can be r elated easily, 
as can the third-- "working conditions above average. 11 
(41, p. 88) 
Another study reported in Personnel (5, ) by 
Haire and Gettsdanker found that the three most important 
single factors in present jobs to workers were " likes associ-
ates, n il supervision, " and afuture advancement. " They went 
on to discover the reasons for liking the job. This was 
done by questionnaire and by a story completion test. The 
reasons given in the questionnaire in order of t heir importance 
to the workers were: interesting job, likes associates, con-
tact with customers, working conditions, and wages. The 
reasons given in the story completion in order of their 
importance to the workers were: interesting job, wages, 
likes associates, fits well with habits of work and life, and 
working conditions. The six mentioned here represent the top 
six out of thirteen reasons mentioned. Those not mentioned 
here represent all other reasons given by 31 and 27 per cent 
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of the workers on each type of survey. 
Tied in with the question of wages and, by extension, 
tied in with pay and promotions is the study of l abor mobil-
ity by Yoder ~rid Heneman (46, p. 482) which demonstrated 
that the higher rental and income groups were least mobile 
and the lower rental and income groups most mobi l e. They 
also demonstrated that males were more mobile than females 
in geographic, occupation, and employer shifts ; and that 
females were more mobile in industry shifts. Airmen are pro-
vided by the service with geographic and employer shifts ; 
permission of occupation shifts should tend to raise reenlist-
ment figures according to this study. The study also demon-
strated that the 20 to 24 age group tends to be more mobile 
while persons with less formal education tend to be less 
mobile. 
A fairly complete study of turnover rates by sex 
and intelligence and/ or ability to hold a 11responsible 
j ob 11 was made by Taft and Mullins under the title, 11Who 
Quits, and Why. " Of the men in the study (22, pp. 300-307) 
who quit their jobs 48% of them had held those jobs for 
less than one year. The total male rate was 17% while the 
total female rate was 30%. The rate for men under 26 years 
of age was 32%. For the age group 14 to 18 it was 43%, 
and for men over 26 it was 23%. This study found that the 
rate on young male turnover increases as intelligence 
decreases and that the trend is reversed on males over 25. 
Turnover rates of more than 50% were found among men under 
26 of an intelligence close to average but not capable of 
filling responsible positions, more than 50% for married 
women between 18 and 36 , and single women over 36 . The 
lowest turnover rates were found among married men over 
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26 and all men over 36. The turnover rates by responsibil-
ity were for all men, 10% and for all women 16%. The rate 
for males not in responsible positions and under 36 years 
of age was 52%. For the same male age group but in respon-
sible positions the rate was 11%. These last figures seem 
rather important. Certainly if a man is influenced to re-
main at or quit his job by whether the job is a responsible 
one or not, then the final influence of the job will be the 
incumbent's perception of the job. If he perceives his job 
as a responsible one he is more likely to remain at it than 
if he perceives it otherwise. This ties in again with 
Mr. Slichter's 5-point stability analysis. 
Pigors and Myers (16 , pp. 96-97) provide concurring 
information on labor turnover and internal mobility. They 
point out that turnover to some extent is necessary to the 
stability of the organization by virtue of providing 11new 
blood" into the organization. For this reason some minimum 
turnover rate equal roughly to the retirement rate and 
disability retirement rate and adjusted to meet the growth 
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needs of the company is a basic necessity. It is also neces-
sary to the morale of the workers in the organization who 
are thus provided with paths of advancement. They also poi nt 
out that 
.•. internal mobility may build teamwork when 
remedial transfers make possible a better adjustment 
between teammates and when upgrading or promotion 
meets a worker's needs and thus resolves inner conflicts. 
An ambitious employee needs to know t hat promotion will 
parallel his increased ability and worth to the company. 
If his job is far below his capacity, he is inevitably 
wasting ability and is subjected to tensions. Similarly, 
if he feels that he is in a "blind-alley" job, he is 
certain to be dissatisfied. The disturbing effect of 
such strains on his equilibrium may, through him, prove 
injurious to group morale .••. In such ways, labor 
turnover and internal mobility may promote individual, 
group, and company interests by increasing work satis-
faction, loyalty, and efficiency. 
One of the most impressive studies of turnover 
seen during my research was one conducted by Wickert survey-
ing employees and ex-employees of the Michigan Bell Telephone 
Company. Several different bases were used in the survey 
including biographical data, employment aptitude tests, a 
neurotic inventory, and a morale measure. There was no 
perceptible difference of significance between the present 
and ex-employees of the company on the first three bases. 
But on the last there was a marked discrimination between 
the two groups. To quote ·Mr. Wickert: (43, pp. 195-197) 
The main point of difference between those who 
stayed with the company and those who left was the 
greater feeling of ego-involvement in the day-to-day 
operations of the company among those who stayed. 
Specifically, those who stayed tended to say (1) they 
had a chance to make decisions on the job, and (2) 
they felt they were making an important contribution 
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to the success of the company. 
• • • these results lend further support to the 
growing evidence that the psychology of ego-involvement 
and participation provides an important and valuable 
approach to the understanding of employee morale. 
All of which corroborates again the passage quoted 
in the first of this section from Mr. Slichter's work on 
turnover. 
In this chapter I have attempted to bring together 
such research data as are pointedly applicable to the 
problem under consideration. Broadly, these are represented 
in the three general sub-headings: Training, Promotion, and 
Turnover and Associated Causes. But, more specifically, 
these data are closely tied in with morale studies, motiva-
tion and frustration concepts, incentives, and other salient 
aspects concerning how and why men train and work. Not the 
least of these particulars are the effects of forcing un-
wanted training and of withholding wanted training, and of 
broadening or narrowing jobs. All of these will (with the 
survey results in Chapter IIIand in the Appendix) be found 
to relate directly with the recommendations generated in 
Chapter V. 
CHAPTER V 
THE FINDINGS Al\TD THEIR MEANING 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In order to assure the coincidence of advancement 
in grade and proficient job qualification and performance, 
it is necessary to tie together training programs, proficiency 
tests, and promotions. In order to meet the requirements of 
a highly mechanized and technical organization efficiently 
at a relatively low training cost, men must be (at least, 
initially) trai ned in highly specialized tasks. The Air 
Force meets these requirements with a dual training program 
which is tied closely to proficiency ratings. These, in 
turn, are prerequisite to grade advancement. · 
The dual training program comprises (1) training 
schools employing classroom work combined with practical 
application utilized primarily for basic indoctrination 
and training and partially for supervisory level training, 
. an~(2) an on-the-job training program complementing the 
school program and utilizing the job itself plus published 
training manuals and progress measurement devices. Together 
they enable an airman to progress through four stages of 
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skill at one specialty from the entry level to the super-
visory level. This ladder type of vertical progression is 
designed to enable airmen to progress in their assigned 
career fields and meet the manpower requirements of the Air 
Force. 
Inevitably, there is larger turnover in some special-
ties than in others. In those career fields where there is 
least turnover the authorizations become filled at the top 
and \vork downward until it is necessary to stop advancement 
in top skills and grade in the field. But,at the same time, 
it is necessary to continue to enter men into the field to 
keep it manned at the lower levels. In fields where the 
turnover is greatest a greater number of men are entered 
than will or can progress through the fields, anticipating 
the high turnover rate. But these measures alone have not 
been sufficient to solve the overage-shortage dilemma. An 
additional solution occurs when one notes that there are 
many career-minded airmen in overage career fields. The 
obvious solution, then, is horizontal training. 
Horizontal training is not an integral part of the 
career ladder progression system for airmen. It is an 
emergency provision to balance manpower requirements. It 
utilizes, however, the same training facilities as are used 
for vertical training. It operates simply by transferring 
an airman from one career ladder to the bottom of another. 
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Both school facilities and OJT programs are utilized for 
horizontal training, the type of training depending on how 
far removed the involved airman's present career ladder is 
from his projected one. Horizontal training is rigidly con-
trolled to insure efficient manpower shifts. 
Control of horizontal training for efficiency's 
sake has the effect of training men from high proficiency 
level overage AFSC's into low proficiency shortage AFSC's. 
Primarily because of his proficiency differential horizontal 
training is not met entirely voluntarily in spite of the 
pressure of stopped progress in the overage AFSC's and in 
spite of the knowledge that progress is possible in a new 
AFSC. Meanwhile, overages and shortages persist and re-
enlistment rates are not satisfactory. 
There are perhaps many actions which, if they could 
be taken individually, would each partially alleviate the 
situation. Not all of them, such as higher pay for scarce 
skills, are realizable at present. Some such actions though 
are realizable. One area for possible action lies in the 
training program. 
Airmen overwhelmingly support the basic purpose and 
achievements of the Air Force OJT Program. They find it 
more effective than a purely formal training program, not too 
fast in pace, and either adequate in content or less than 
what they want. At any instant in time a small minority of 
airmen are actually undergoing training. There is ample 
time and reason for a vast expansion of the application of 
the OJT Program as it exists now. Airmen condemn half-
hearted local implementation of OJT and universally appre-
ciate programs seriously carried out or those which go 
beyond Air Force requirements to give them extra training. 
Those who claim to be overtaxed by the program are a very 
small minority. 
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Airmen are proud of their skills, be they highly 
technical, administrative, or of the services type. Class-
ification of their career fields as surplus or special sur-
plus is disconcerting to them because of controls placed on 
advancement in skill and in grade. But more discouraging 
to an airman is his involuntary selection to undergo 
horizontal training. Such selection implies to him that 
his personal skill is more expendable to the Air Force than 
the skill of his fellow workers who are not selected for 
horizontal training. He is not likely to take such selec-
tion as a compliment to his ability and aptitude even 
though the selection is based on such qualities. Airmen 
who have attained high skill levels through many years of 
training and experience a~e more fiercely resentful of 
involuntary horizontal training than are younger, lower 
skilled airmen, but the higher skills represent the 
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greatest overages and these are the ones most often selected 
for horizontal training. 
Aggravating the situation is the fact that men 
selected for horizontal training enter at the lowest level 
in the new career and compete with new recruits. On the 
average, the new recruit is not only somewhat be t ter educated, 
but his education is more recent and fresher in his mind. 
Status also enters into the picture. The status of 
an NCO is psychologically based on superior skill. The 
number of stripes and the greater maturity of the NCO are 
visual evidence or symbols of the status level. Psycho-
logically, though, they (the symbols) are hollow to him if 
the base of superior skill is denied him through a career 
field change. His fear that the recruit will not recognize 
his superior status when all he has to back it up are age 
and grade is a genuine fear and probably well founded. 
Only a very intelligent and understanding recruit would 
recognize his right to superior status. 
Among younger airmen there is less resistance to 
horizontal training. In some fields where training and 
advancement to the top have been halted, the younger, 
lower proficiency level airmen ~ to enter another 
field. In most cases these airmen are not allowed to -
enter new fields because of the need to keep trying to 
relieve the overage at the higher skill level. This 
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leaves such airmen in ffblind alley" careers -- careers in 
which they cannot advance and from which they cannot transfer. 
Their only alternative to complacency is a discharge. If 
discharged they still may not reenlist into a scarce career 
field no matter how desirous they may be to make a career 
of the Air Force. Careers for which they are qualified, 
which they desire to enter, and in which the Air Force needs 
men badly are still not open to them; but the same fields 
are open to new recruits who quali fy even though many of the 
new recruits may be determined not to make the Air Force a 
career. 
Motivation to train, to improve one's skill is 
another factor threatened by manpower policies. Airmen in 
"blind alley" careers suffer motivational reverses and 
often frustration either because no openings exist at higher 
levels, or because advancement to higher grades is frozen, 
or both. Airmen in scarce career fields, though not 
frustrated in their careers, often find advancement does 
not require so serious a training program as they might find 
under more competitive conditions. The result in these cases 
is insufficient motivation, motivation based on individual 
initiative -- a matter of choice with the airman. This can 
lead to boredom and an underestimation of the importance of 
their jobs. If the latter occurs, the psychological impact 
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is not unlike that which airmen in surplus and special 
surplus career fields feel about their jobs when told that 
they are extraneous. 
Motivation is closely related to responsibility 
another important job factor affected. The Taft and 
Mullins (22, pp. 300-307) turnover study quoted in the pre-
ceding chapter has established the relationship between 
worker stability and responsibility of the job. Therefor e, 
to the extent that jobs are perceived to be responsible ones 
airmen will take pride in doing them and will be less likely 
to give them up for a discharge. One seven level airman 
interviewed was discouraged by the fact that he had no 
supervisory duties although his job title included that 
designation. He liked the work he was doing, but felt that 
somehow his skills were not being completely utilized. Per-
haps, in his case, the title of "expert" rather than 11 super-
visor" would have made all the difference in squaring his 
feelings of usefulness. The airman's feeling about the 
responsibility of his job and other related job feelings 
which in sum are his feelings of participation may account 
for the high number of scarce career field airmen who do 
not intend to find related divilian occupations when they 
accept discharges after their present enlistments. 
The Air Force system of classification and assign-
ment utilizes the knowledge it gains about the new recruit 
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to place him in a career for which he shows aptitude. This 
insures in most cases that men are well placed. Some airmen 
show aptitude in a variety of skills or in more than one. 
The career ladder system does not provide for this contin-
gency. Aptitude ia a particular field in a particular amount 
is an expected individual difference. Likewise, versatility 
in potential is ascertainable and is an expected individual 
difference. For best manpower utilization both should be 
taken into account and their developme~t provided for in 
the training program and subsequent job assignments. 
Versatility, of course, is not a quality which is, 
like blue eyes, either there or not. The range of versatil-
ity from the least to the most is a continuum which cannot 
be logically partitioned at any one point. But mathematicians 
stop motion in order to define and study it. I will be no 
less scientific than they by calling some men versatile and 
others not. 
Airmen comprise both versatile men and men who are 
not. Generally, it will be found that versatile men are 
intelligent men. Psychologically, all men require 
reasonably full development of their potentials and 
reasonably complete taxation of their skills. Lack of 
that development and utilization is frustrating; frustra-
tion leads to dissatisfaction with the job and finally to 
discharge or to rigid, non-constructive behavior and 
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eventually to withdrawal and regression. Airmen who lack 
versatility but display a particular aptitude with a growth 
potential are well suited to the career ladder type of 
progression. They are less apt to become frustrated, more 
apt to realize full development of their potentials in this 
type of utilization. Conversely, the more versatile the 
airman, the less likely will the career ladder satisfy his 
training and utilization need, and the less likely will the 
Air Force realize full value from the airman. 
Often, in years &one by, master sergeants were 
placed in jobs in which they had had no previous experience. 
Such assignments were justified on the ground merely that 
the man was a master sergeant. This was at least an intui-
tive recognition of the necessity of versatility to reach 
top NCO levels. The need for specialization because of the 
highly technical nature of many Air Force jobs does not 
cancel out the need for versatility. It merely means that 
more training is necessary. Now, both technical skill and 
wide potential need to be developed to achieve and maintain 
effective NCO corps. 
Versatility development through the horizontal train-
ing facilities and policies now offered and expounded in the 
Air Force is inadequate to meet the task for several reasons. 
First is the fact that such training is offered in limited 
numbers -- very few airmen are affected. Second is the fact 
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that it is not an integral part of the career program. Third 
is the fact that when offered the accepting airman is made 
to recognize the uselessness of his present skill to the Air 
Force and to himself as a member of the Air Force -- a 
psychological affront not easily accepted heartily. 
It is only a step further to assert that versatility 
distinguishes the extraordinary airman from the ordinary one. 
If this is true, then training, manpower, and promotion 
policies now extant tend to encourage stability in the less 
desirable airmen and to encourage instability or regressive 
behavior among the more desirable ones. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Reenlistment Handbook For ~ Force Supervisors 
(33, pp. 30-35) contains a chapter enti'tled, "Countering 
Objections. " In this chapter are listed fifteen objections 
often heard by men engaged in trying to reenlist airmen. 
Each item is discussed and the reader is advised on methods 
of countering these objections. Four of those listed are 
the type of thing this thesis has explored. They are: 
(1) n i don't see any future for me in the Air Force. " 
(2) "The Air Force has a poor promotion policy. 11 (3) "Lack 
of opportunity for technical training I am interested in. u 
and (4) nLack of opportunity for advancement. 11 In discussing 
the second of these four, the manual states that the :'Pr'anotion 
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policy, per ~' is not poor11 but 11mechanics of integrating 
skill levels, averages, and shortages • make up the dif-
ficulties of administering such policy11 and that 11 inequities 
will arise. 11 This sums up, I think, the basis of all four 
of the quoted objections. The statement quoted goes on to 
say that 11many people who can criticize a policy can offer 
no solution. 11 This, I trust, will not be considered ap-
plicable to me. I have a recommendation. I hope that it 
will be considered an acceptable solution. 
My recommendation is simply this: Incorporate 
horizontal training into the airman career program as an 
integral part of the advancement system. As a discussion of 
the details will show, this will not require basic and costly 
changes. This is the plan. Retain all three level AFSC's 
as they now exist. Eliminate half of the present five level 
AFSC's and three quarters of the present seven level AFSC's. 
This mass elimination of AFSC's i s, of course, not to be 
done haphazardly, nor could it be done in one fell swoop. 
The process will have to be gradual ; the end result will 
be an alteration from a combination of the three position 
promotion system and the seniority system to a combination 
of the multiple chain promotion system and the seniority 
promotion system. (See Chapter IV on Promotions.) 
The resulting career field will appear graphically 
as a pyramid instead of as a ladder. At the top of the 
pyramid will be a seven level. Beneath this will be two 
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five levels; beneath each of the five levels will be two 
three levels. Normal progression will be from one of the 
two three levels to the five level above them. · From this 
point to a seven level the airman will have two alternatives 
winding up at the top of one of the two pyramids in which 
he progressed up to and including the five level. Normal 
progression, then, offers each three level airman one five 
level spot above him to work toward and two seven level 
spots to choose from thereafter. Normal progression is 
represented in Appendix J by the solid lines. There is, 
of course, the continuing possibility of overages in 
certain AFSC's. Should overages occur in the five level 
or in both of the seven level AFSC's, horizontal progression 
will occur. This is represented by the broken lines in 
Appendix J. 
Training,, on the other hand, will be entirely 
horizontal. A three level airman, once out of school, will 
serve in his AFSC for a minimum period to insure solid grasp 
of the skill. He will serve in that skill for no longer than 
a certain maximum period so that his training can continue. 
This training will be through OJT in the alternate three 
level AFSC in the same sub-pyramid. Once both skills are 
learned the airman is given a five level AFSC. Again the 
airman will serve between a minimum and a maximum period in 
the five level AFSC after which the airman will OJT in a 
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five level AFSC either to the r i ght or left of him depend-
ing on the seven level AFSC into which he is to progress 
eventually. Again, a certain mi nimum period of time will 
have to be spent to insure proficiency before passing on to 
the seven level AFSC. Continued progress will depend 
naturally upon continuing successful training and job per-
formance. 
In the event normal progress is made impossi ble by 
one or another overage, horizontal training will continue 
through enough AFSC's at the same level as will permit 
the airman to reach a point where vertical progression 
through a pyramid is possible by normal means. This will 
apply equally to three and five levels. An example, using 
Appendix J, would be a three level airman, AFSC 56530 , 
who finds the five level spot above h i m (a combination of 
AFSC's 56550 and 56650) is presently overmanned. He then 
OJT's for AFSC 56430 and subsequently for 56330. He is 
then awarded AFSC 56355 (or a combination of AFSC's 56350 , 
56450, and 56550) . The third and fourth digits of the 
suggested AFSC's represent the skills covered in the a i r-
man's background.) Progress for our hypothetical airman 
from the five level in AFSC 56355 might take ei ther of 
two directi ons to the seven level. In one case he will 
become an AFSC 56157 ; in the other, an AFSC 56367. (It 
will be noted i n my suggested AFSC's that the fifth digit 
is the skill level for five and seven level airmen.) 
For promotion purposes airmen will be judged among 
other criteria on the breadth of their skills. In this 
way an airman such as was described in the above paragraph 
will not lose promotion points because of the necessity 
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of horizontal training and progression. Under this system 
no airman will progress beyond a skill he has not mas·tered, 
though he may reverse his direction and continue to attempt 
to rise in the new direction. 
The question of initial implementation of the plan 
naturally arises. My answer to that problem is mainly 
concerned with qualifying seven level airmen, who have the 
greatest task in broadening their present skills fourfold. 
During the implementation I would cut basic technical 
schooling to the minimums stated for the various categories 
of AFSC's. That is, in AFSC's where ten percent of the 
airmen in the AFSC must have gone to school, cut the number 
being sent to school to ten per cent of the input for the 
field. Devote all school facilities not so utilized to 
broadening the skills of present seven level airmen. At 
the same time, start all other airmen on OJT in accordance 
with this plan. Wherever OJT can be used to broaden seven 
level airmen, use it also. 
The program can be implemented as gradually as is 
thought necessary. For example, the pyramids may grow 
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slowly by a long range combining of pairs of seven level 
AFSC's, working eventually into narrow based pyramids, and 
later into the optimum breadth of pyramidal bases. Pyramids 
need not rigidly conform to a base of four three level air-
men; some, depending on the indi vidual field involved, could 
have bases of two, three, five, or six three level airmen, 
with one to three five levels between the threes and the 
seven at the top. These are minor considerations. The 
main feature and most important aspect of the pyramidal 
career plan is the overlapping of the pyramids at the base 
and five level; this in turn is the feature that allows con-
tinued broadening of skills by an integrated horizontal 
training system. 
The present OJT Program will meet OJT's needs under 
the new plan. The main point of difference here is that 
each airman will learn from twice to four or five times the 
amount of material he presently learns, and he will be 
tested more widely and more frequently. What will be re-
quired is a much wider distribution and use of present 
publications. 
Some publications will require revision or r,epublica-
tion. The present U chart will be outmoded and should be 
replaced with an 0 chart. This will be made up of the 
complete series of overlapping career pyramids. This will 
necessitate in some cases a revision of the adjacency of 
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present AFSC's to insure that there is reasonable overlapping 
of the career pyramids. Revised paste-on manual covers will 
have to be put on present OJT Package Programs showing the 
new designations, related manuals, and a portion of the ap-
plicable career pyramids so that the airman can see where 
he is and where he is going in his Air Force career. It is, 
of course, understood that regulations, the OJT index, and 
the training prospectus will have to undergo changes and 
revisions to reflect the program. 
There remains one question: Is the birth worth the 
pain? I can state with some assurance what the birth will 
bring, but I'm in no position to estimate ' the pain involved. 
These are my claims for the plan: 
For the Air Force: 
1. It offers a more nearly automatic solution 
of overage and shortage career fields. 
2. It will eliminate the necessity of bringing 
pressure to bear on incumbents of overage 
AFSC's. 
3. It will reduce the total number of AFSC's 
and thereby simplify control and inventory 
of specialties. 
4. It will vastly simplify assignment problems 
in five and seven level AFSC's. 
5. It will effectively silence four major 
objections to reenlistment. 
6 . It will identify automatically and more 
positively the quality of individual airmen 
and more surely enable the best to progress 
and the poorest to find their proper and 
manageable skill levels. 
7. It will bring to nothing all the present 
reasons for resistance to horizontal train-
ing. 
8. It will eliminate blind alley jobs. 
9. It will eliminate most of the necessity for 
restrictions to advancement and promotions. 
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10. It will attract higher quality airmen and 
discourage lower quality ones while providing 
jobs for both. 
For the airman: 
1. It enables airmen to make some choice in the 
matter of his career by offering him alternate 
paths of advancement. 
2. It enables all airmen to achieve skills com-
mensurate with their abilities and ambitions. 
3. It recognizes and rewards excellence. 
4 • . It gives higher airmen grades a firm status 
basi s and thereby builds NCO prestige. 
5. It largely eliminates the threat to airman 
careers created by grade and skill level 
freezes. 
6. It creates jobs and skills which lend them-
selves to a greater feeling of intimate 
participation in Air Force affairs. 
7. It puts promotions on a more competitive 
basis. 
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8. It assures airmen that learning of new skills 
is purposeful and that no skill once covered 
is allowed to atrophy through suspended use. 
It recognizes all successful training by sub-
sequent assignments and promotions. 
9. It provides airmen within the Air Force one 
of the things the lack of which now accounts 
in part for their non-reenlistment -- a chance 
to shift jobs. 
10. Because of the necessary accomplishment of 
intermediate steps to achieve higher skill 
levels and with them promotions, it provides 
psychological advancement recognizable by 
airmen as a positive step toward promotion. 
11. It knocks down the artificial barriers cre-
ated by isolated work groups. 
12. It makes jobs more interesting by making 
them more varied. 
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GENEPAL PLAN FOR AIR FORCE TRAINING OF AIRMEN SH0~1ING RELATION BETWEEN 
TRAINING ACTIVITIES OF THE AIR TRAINING COMMAND SCHOOLS AND THE RESPON-
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From: Figure 2. pp. 101-6 of T-4-71-I OJT Administrator-Supervisor Course - Student Text-














































Skill Level Job Progression Grade Level 
Figure 4. Career Field Chart Showing Job Progression (from 
pp. 101-13 of T-4-71-I OJT Administrator-Supervisor Course-
Student Textbook Course XX 75000-7, Scott AFB, Ill., 22 November 
1954 .) 
1. AFSC ? 
APPENDIX C 
THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
2. Scarce? Surplus ? Special Surplus?' 
3. Job title? 
4. Category of Specialty? 
5. Present OJT status: 
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a. In training for higher proficiency level? 
b. Cross training to a new AFSC ? If so, which one? 
c. Not in training because •..• 
6 . Do you consider your (OJT) training (more, less, equally 
as) effective (than, as) a formal classroom course in 
the same subject? 
7. Has the learning or training pace of OJT in your field 
been (too fast, too slow, about right) ? 
8. Is (OJT) training in your specialty (too much, too little, 
about right) ? 
9. Had you made up your mind to serve only one enlistment 
before you entered the Air Force? 
10. Do you intend to reenlist? 
If "yes" answer 11, 12, and 13. If "no" , 14, 15 and 16 . 
11. Has OJT affected your decision to reenlist? If so, how? 
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12. Do you expect to continue OJT in the same occupation? 
If not, why not ? 
13. Do you expect to OJT for another occupation at any 
time in the future ? Do you want to? 
14. Has OJT affected your decisi on not to reenlist? 
If so, how? 
15. Do you expect to enter a civilian occupation (or further 
education) related to your present service job? 
16 . Do you consider your OJT adequate training for a c i vil-
ian occupation? 
17. Do you know what your AQE scores were? 
18. Attend a technical training school ? 
19. Present grade ? 
20. Time in present grade in months ? 
21. Time in previous grade in months? 
22. Working in best qualified job? 
23. Working in most desired job? 
24. Formal education? 1 to 8? 9 to 12? 13 to 16?' 
More than 16? 
25. Is your present job related to your formal education? 
How? 
26 . Have promotions for you been (faster, slower, about 
the same) (than, as) for other men? 
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27. Have promotions come to you easier or harder because 
of your OJT? 
28. ~Vhat other things have (helped, hindered) you in get-
ting promotions ? 
2 0 J. Are you married or single? 
30. Number of children? Number of dependents other 
than wife or children'? 
31. Any income other than job pay? 
living?) 
32. Age? 
(Must you work for a 
33. Years of service? (to the nearest ~ year) 
34. \Vhat is your present enlistment number? (First, Second, 
etc.) 
35. Any other comments on OJT? (For example: Recommended 
changes? Estimated effectiveness? Desirability of 
technical training school or further technical traini ng 
school? Changes in tenninology such as 11hard core" 
and 11 soft core" .) 
APPENDIX D 
NOTES ON APPENDIX D 
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Thi s appendix comprises six tables of answers to the 
t hesis OJT questionnaire. The answers contained in these 
tables were extracted from answers to questions 5-10 , 18-27, 
and 29-34. Thi s accounts for 22 of the 35 quest i ons. As 
has been pointed out previously, question four has been 
dropped and question seventeen was so incompletely answered 
that it wi ll merely be the subject of passing comment. "Job 
titles, 11 the answers to question three, are listed in Table I 
in Chapter III opposite AFSC's, the answers to question one. 
The tables i n this appendix are broken down in accordance 
with informati on obtained from questions one, two, ten, and 
nineteen. Thus questions 11-16 , 28, and 35 are not treated 
in these tables; the nature of the answers to them i s such 
that they do not lend themselves to table compilation in 
close form. They will be treated separately. 
Each of the tables wi ll comprise 23 columns with a 
number· code at the top of each column. 
key to that code : 
The following is the 
Column 1. In this column will appear numbers from 
1 to 30 , numbers which were designated 
by me to distinguish one respondent from 
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another within each of three groups: seven 
level special surplus, five level surplus 
and special surplus, and five level scarce. 
Column 2. Y is for Yes. I attended an AF technical 
school. N is for No, I did not attend 
such a school. 
Column 3. M is for I consider OJT more effective 
than a formal classroom course in the 
same subject. L is for I consider OJT 
less effective than a formal classroom 
course in the same subject. E is for I 
consider ·OJT equally as • . . 
Column 4. This has to do with estimates of the 
pace of OJT. F means that the airman 
thinks it too fast; S means that he 
thinks it too slow; R means he thi nks 
the pace to be about right. 
Column 5. This questions the airman as to the 
amount of material covered by OJT i n 
the airman's specialty. M is for too 
much; R is for about the right amount ; 
L is for too little material. 
Column 6 . This is in answer to the question whether 
the airman is presently in OJT. Yes or 
No are the answers abbreviated by Y or N. 
121 
APPENDIX D (Continued) 
Column 7. This answers the question of type of 
OJT in which the airman is engaged. 
V is for vertical, within the same 
specialty to a higher profici ency level ; 
H is for horizontal, or cross training. 
It is answered only in those cases where 
a yes answer appears in the preceding 
column. 
Column 8. This ascertains whether the airman con-
siders that he is working in his best 
qualified job. Possible answers are 
only Y(es) or N(o). 
Column 9. This ascertains whether the airman con-
siders that he is working in the job he 
prefers most to be in. Y(es) or N(o) 
are the possibles. 
Column 10. This ascertains whether or not the air-
man finished high school. No considera-
tion is given GED in the answer here 
although many airmen have completed the 
equivalent of complete high school 
through GED. Again, Y or N are the 
possible answers. 
APPENDIX D (Continued) 
Column 11. This is answered Y(es) by the airman 
if he considers his formal education 
and his job to be related; N(o) if he 
does not. 
Column 12. This answer ascertains whether the 
airman thinks his promotions have come 
to him faster, slower, or about the 
same as for other airmen. F, if he 
thinks faster; S, if he thinks slower ; 
M, if he thinks they have been about 
the same. 
Column 13. If the airman thinks that OJT had no 
effect on his being promoted, no 
answer is given in this column. If, 
however, he thinks OJT has made promo-
tions easier (E) or harder (H), such 
an answer is given. 
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Column 14. A ~(es) answer here means that the air-
man has some source of income in addition 
to his job pay. It may mean any one of 
several sources. 
Column 15. This is in answer to a question as to 
what the airman's original intentions 
were before entering service as to 
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serving beyond one enlistment. A Y(es) 
answer indicates that he intended to 
serve only one enlistment. N(o) indicates 
nothing more than an open mind -- not that 
he intended to serve more than one enlist-
ment. 
Column 16 . This signifies the airman's present grade. 
Number 7 is Master Sergeant, 6 is Tech-
nical Sergeant, 5 is Staff Sergeant, 
4 is Airman, First Class, and 3 is Airman, 
Second Class. 
Column 17. This gives the number of months the air-
man has served in his present grade. 
Column 18. This is the number of months the airman 
served in his previous and lower grade. 
In some cases this time is from another 
branch of service; in others it is noted 
that the airman previously served in a 
higher grade. 
Column 19. This is marital status: either M(arried) 
or S(ingle). 
Column 20. This column indicates the number of 
dependents in addition to the airman 
himself. 
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Column 21. This is the a i rman's age. 
Column 22. This is the airman's years of active 
service in all services to the nearest 
half year. 
Column 23. This last column gives the a i rman's 
enlistment number of his present 
enlistment. 
APPENDIX D (Continued) 
TABLE A 
SEVEN LEVEL AIRMEN IN SPECIAL SURPLUS AFSC 1 s WHO INTEND TO REENLIST, BY GRADE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 N L s L y H N N y N s N N 5 54 36 M 2 30 11~ 3 
3 N E R R N - y y N N M N N 5 30 14 M 1 27 9 3 
4 N L R R N - y y N N s N N 5 26 12 M 3 26 9 3 
6 y E R L N 
-
N N y N s E N y 5 61 6 M 2 29 12 3 
7 y M s M N - y y y N s y N 5 86 2 M 3 31 7 4 
10 N M R L N - y y N N M e y N 5 62 38 M t~ 28 10 4 
13 N E R R y H N y y y s N y 5 65 36 M 4 42 13 4 
19 y M R L N - y y N N M N N 5 60 4 M 5 32 9 3 
22 y L R L N - y y N N F y N 5 26 18 M 2 23 6 2 
27 N E R M . N - y y y N s N N 5 46 15 M 3 28 11 4 
28 N M F L N - N N N N s N N 5 54 15 s 0 33 13 4 
5 y L R L N - N N N N M N N 6 18 60 M 2 27 9}2 3 
8 N M R M N - y y y y F N N 6 97 12 M 4 36 12 3 
12 N L - R N - y y N N s y N 6 152 12 M 4 33 16 4 
16 y L R 
-
N - y y y y s E N y 6 78 24 M 2 30 12 3 
17 N M R L N - N y y y M y N 6 62 8 M 4 37 12 4 
18 N E s L N - y y y y M N y 6 62 30 M 1 30 12 3 
20 y M R - N - y N y N M y N . 6 . 48 24 s 0 27 10 3 
21 N L s M N - N N y y F N y 6 40 32 M 2 30 11 4 
24 y M R L N - y y y N M E N N 6 56 17 s 0 30 10 4 
25 N M R L N - y y N N s E y y 6 32 77 M 5 43 12~2 4 
29 y L F R N y y N N s E N y " 80 54 M 4 38 14 4 - 0
30 N M - R y v y y y N s N N 6 50 24 M 2 37 11 2 
2 N M R R N - y y y N F E N N 7 41 25 M 4 30 11 3 
9 y M R R N - y y y N F E N y 7 159 • 19 M 0 40 19~ 5 
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TABLE B 
SEVEN LEVEL AIRMEN IN SPECIAL SURPLUS AFSC's i~O DO NOT INTEND TO REENLIST, BY GRADE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 v:~ 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
14 N L R L N - N y y y y N 6 52 0 M 5 38 18 2 
26 y M R L N - y y N N M E y y 6 74 7 M 2 35 15 4 
15 N M - L N - y N N N s N y 7 58 32 M 6 38 17 5 
APPENDIX D (Continued) 
TABLE c 
FIVE LEVEL AIRMEN IN SURPLUS AND SPECIAL SURPLUS AFSC's \~0 INTEND TO REENLIST, BY GRADE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
27 y M R R N 
-
y y N N M E N N 3 14 a M 1 29 10 3 
10 y E R R y v y y N N M N y 4 12 18 M 1 25 7 3 
15 y M R H N 
-
y y y y M E N y 4 6 21 M 3 23 3 2 
17 y M R R N 
-
y y y y F E y y 4 7 12 M 1 23 6 2 
23 y L R L N - y y y N s N N 4 1 27 M 2 22 4 2 
24 y M R R N y y N N M E N y 4 7 10 s 0 23 3 1 
1 y L s L y v y y y N s H N N 5 66 13 M 3 28 93-:a 4 
2 y E R R N - y y y N M E N N 5 42 36 M 4 26 8~ 3 
5 N L 
- - N - y y y N s y y 5 96 1 M 1 38 11 3 
7 y M R R y v y N y y s y y 5 66 6 s 0 28 10 3 
9 y M R L N - y y y N M H y y 5 24 18 M 2 37 10 3 
14 y M s L N - y y y N M E N y 5 4 18 s 1 21 4 2 
25 y M R R N - y y N N M E N N 5 llb c M 1 33 14 3 
26 y M R R N - N N N N F E y N 5 26 18 s 0 24 7 2 
a. 52 months in previous grade of Staff Sergeant. 
b. plus 34 months in the Navy at an equivalent grade. 
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TABLE D 
FIVE LEVEL AIRMEN IN SURPLUS AND SPECIAL SURPLUS AFSC' s WHO DO NOT INTEND TO REENLIST, BY GRADE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
16 y M R R N - N N N N s - N N 3 26 8 s 1 24 4 1 
3 y M s R N - N N N N M - N N 4 10 21 M 1 22 31-/2 1 
LJ,. y E s R N - N y y N s H y y 4 3 30 M 2 22 " .1:: .)2 1 
12 y M R R N - y y y N M E N N 4 1 17 M 2 21 2 1 
13 y L s L y H y y y N s E N y 4 3 19 M 1 21 2~ 1 
18 y M R L N - y N y N M - N y 4 3 17 s 0 21 2~ 1 
20 y M R R N - y y y y F - N y 4 16 17 s 0 22 4 1 
21 y M s L y H N N y N M E y y 4 7 15 s 0 22 2~ 2 
22 y L s L y H N N y y M H N y 4 4 22 s 0 21 3 1 
28 y M R R N - y y N N s - N N 4 39 14 s 1 23 6 2 
29 N L R L N - y y N y M - N y 4 19 12 M 3 23 5 2 
30 N L R R N - y y N N F E N N 4 14 8 s 0 20 3 1 
6 y M R R N - y y y y M E N N 5 26 21 M 3 26 5~ 2 
8 y M R R N - y y N N M - N N 5 30 12 M 1 27 5 2 
11 y L s L y v y y y N M - N y 5 42 16 M r t 31 10 3 .) 
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TABLE E 
FIVE LEVEL AIRMEN IN SCARCE AFSC's WHO INTEND TO REENLI ST, BY GRADE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
3 y M R R N - N N y N F E y N 4 3 15 s 0 20 
10 y M R R N - y y N y s N y 4 4 24 s 0 24 
13 y M R R y v y y y y F E N N 4 1 13 s 0 20 
16 y M R L N - y y y y M y N 4 13 23 M 1 25 
18 y M s R N 
-
y y N N F E y N 4 23 9 s 0 23 
23 y M R R y v y N y N M H N y 4 12 20 M 1 22 
24 y M R R N 
-
y N y N s N y 4 9 19 M 2 23 
25 y M R 'R N 
-
y y N N s N y 4 17 22 M 1 28 
26 y M R L N - y y N N F N N 4 9 9 s 0 21 
27 y M R R N 
-
y y N N F E y y 4 6 9 M 3 28 
1 y M R R N 
-
y N y N F E N N 5 4 16 s 1 25 
6 y M R R N - y y y N s N N 5 3 24 M 2 23 
7 y M R R N - y y y y M N N 5 31 24 M 2 26 
9 y M R R y H y y y N M E N N 5 72 11 M 4 28 
14 y M R R y v y y N N M N N 5 14 20 M 3 25 
15 y E R R N - y N y N F N N 5 26 20 M 3 22 
17 y M R R N 
-
y y y N s N y 5 3 24 M 1 28 
19 y L s L y v y y y N M N y 5 57 23 M 5 28 
20 y M R R N - y y y y F N y 5 12 18 M 1 25 
21 y M R R y v y y y y s y y 5 7 26 M 3 24 
22 y M R L N - y y y N M E N y 5 12 14 s 0 24 
30 . y L 
-
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TABLE F 
FIVE LEVEL AIRMEN IN SCARCE AFSC's \iHO DO NOT INTEND TO REENLIST, BY GRADE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
11 y M R R N - y y N N M y N 3 23 25 M .4 21 4 1 
2 y M R R N - y N y N s N y 4 10 16 s 0 24 5 2 
4 y M R R N - y y y N s N y 4 13 23 M 1 20 3~ 1 
5 y M R L y H y y y N M E N y 4 9 17 M 2 23 3~ 1 
8 y M R M N - y y N N M E N y 4 9 18 s 0 22 3 1 
28 y M R R N - y y y N M N y 4 16 18 M 3 24 5 · 2 
12 y M R R y v y N y N F E N N 5 3 18 s 1 22 4 1 
29 y L s R N - N N y N M N y 5 6 20 s 0 23 6 2 
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AIRMAN ESTIMATE OF SPEED OF PROMOTION COMPARED WITH ACTUAL 
RATE OF REMAINDER OF GROUP OF TIME IN GRADE FIGURES, BY 
REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS, BY SKILL CLASSIFICATION, 
BY SKILL LEVEL AND BY GRADE 
Airmen Intending to Reenlist 
Seven Level, Special Surplus 
Master Sergeants (total of 4) 
2 think their promotions 
Months 
were faster-------------- Average time present grade 100 
Average time previous grade 22 
Total 122 
Remainder of group (2) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate in error by 62 months. 
Technical Sergeants (total of 12) 




. were faster-------------- Average time present grade 68~ 
Average time previous grade 22 
Total 90~ 
Remainder of group (10) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate correct by 6 .3 months. 
5 think their promotions 
were slower-------------- Average time presen t grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Remainder of group (7) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
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Months 
Staff Sergeants (total of 11) 
1 thinks his promotions were 
faster-------------------- Average time present grade 26 
Average time previous grade 18 
Total 44 
Remainder of group (10) Average time present grade 54.4 
Average time previous grade 17.8 
Total 72.2 
Estimate correct by 28.2 months. 
7 think their promotions were 
slower-------------------- Average time present grade 56 
Average time previous grade 17 
Total 44 
Remainder of group (4) Average time present grade 44.5 
Average time previous grade 19 
Total 63 .5 
Estimate correct by 9~ months. 
Five Level, Surplus and Special Surplus 
Staff Sergeants (total of 8) 
1 thinks his promotions were 
faster-------------------- Average time present grade 26 
Remainder of group (6) 
Average time previous grade 18 
Total 44 
Average time present grade 





Estimate correct by 21 months. 
3 think their promotions were 
slower---------------------Average time present grade 76 
Remainder of group (4) 
Average time previous grade 7 
Total 83 
Average time present grade 





Estimate correct by 36~ months. 
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Airmen, First Class (total of 5) 
1 thinks his promotions were 
Months 
faster-------------------- Average time present grade 7 
Average time previ ous grade 12 
Total 19 
Remainder of group (4) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate correct by 6.5 months. 




slower-------------------- Average time present grade 1 
Average time previous grade 27 
Total 28 
Remainder of group (4) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate correct by 5.25 months. 
There is only one A/2C in this category. 
Five Level, Scarce 




3 think their promotions wereAvera e 
faster-------------------- g Average 
Total 
time present grade 14 
time previous grade 18 
32 
Remainder of group (9) Average time present grade 22.2 
Average time previous grade 21.3 
Total 43.5 
Estimate correct by 11.5 months. 
3 think their promotions were 
slower-------------------- Average time present grade 4.3 
Average time previous grade 18.5 
Total 22.8 
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Remainder of group (9) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate in error by 21.7 months. 
Airmen, First Class (total of 10) 
5 think their promotions were 
faster-------------------- Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Remainder of group (5) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate correct by 13.2 months. 











slower-------------------- Average time present grade 10 
Average time previous grade 21. 6 
Total 31.6 
Remainder of group (7) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate correct by 2.9 months. 
Airmen Intending Not to Reenlist 
Seven Level, Special Surplus 
Master Sergeants. There is only one in this category; no 
comparison is possible. 
Technical Sergeants. There are only two in this category; 
neither thinks his promotions were faster or slower than 




Staff Sergeants. There are no Staff Sergeants in this category. 
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Five Level, Surplus and Special Surplus 
Staff Sergeants (total of 4). None of the four t hink that 
their promotions were either faster or slower than those 
of other airmen. 
Airmen, First Class (total of 11) 
2 think their promotions were 
Months 
faster-------------------- Average time present grade 15 
Average time previous grade 12.5 
Total 27.5 
Remainder of group (9) 
Estimate correct by.9 months. 
3 think their promotions were 
Average time present grade 





slower-------------------- Average time present grade 15 
Average time previous grade 21 
Total 3o 
Remainder of group (8) Average time present grade 
Average time previous grade 
Total 
Estimate correct by 10.65 months. 
Airman, Second Class. There is only one in this category. 
Five Level, Scarce 
Staff Sergeants (total of 2) 
1 thinks his promotions were 
faster------------------- Time present grade 
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Remainder of group (1) 
Estimate correct by 5 months. 
Time present grade 
Time previous grade 
Total 
Airmen, First Class (total of 5) 





slower-------------------- Average time present grade 11.5 
Remainder of group (3) 
Estimat e correct by 2 months 
Average time previous grade 19 .5 
Total 31 
Average time present grade 





Airmen, Second Class. There is only one in this category. 
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COMMENTS TO THE QUESTION, 11DO YOU WANT TO OJT FOR ANOTHER 
OCCUPATION AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE? 11 
1. Depends on whether I get another stripe in this career 
field. 
2. Did not, but glad I'm doing it now. 
3. No, but if it is necessary in order to make Master 
Sergeant I will. 
4. No, prefer to remain in present career field if advancement 
possibilities continue to exist. 
5. Yes, into radar AFSC. (He is now in radio.) 
6 . Yes, into radio AFSC. (He is now in radar.) 
7. Yes, into related career field--3LI-230A. (He is now a 34151B) 
8. Yes, electronics. (He is now a heating repairman.) 
9. Yes, meat cutter. (He is now a baker.) 
10. No objection -- definitely would to better opportuni ties. 
11. Yes, plumbing and heating. (He is now a cook.) 
12. Yes, to 43 field. (Mechanic from radio repairman~) 
13. Yes, jet mechanic. (He is now a hydraulic mechanic.) 
14. Depending on promotions in the future. 
15. Uncertain -- maybe to flight engineer. 
16 . Yes, auto mechanic. (He is now a jet aircraft mechanic.) 
17. Yes, to rockets, guided missiles. 
18. Don't know. 
19. Yes -- to jets. (He is now an engine conditioning 
technician. 
20. Want to, but probably won't get a chance to. 
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ANSWERS TO THE TI~O QUESTIONS AS TO TNHETHER OJT liAS HAD ANY 
EFFECT ON REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS (AFFIRMATIVE ONLY) 
1. Yes, adversely. 
2. Yes, every other seven level in the squadron must cross-
train involuntarily -- adverse effect. 
3. Yes, helped in career field -- brought up to necessary 
capacity. 
4. Yes, adversely. Has effect of forcing people to get out 
of service. 
5. Yes, can't get into career field I want. 
6 . Could have had adverse effect, but was fortunate. 
Career field fouled up. 
7. No, but did on a prior enlistment. 
8. Yes, present job is better than previous and training 
got me in better job. 
9. Yes, but not enough to alter my decision to reenlist. 
10. Yes, because it would qualify me for advancement. 
11. Yes, OJT and manning requirements will determine. 
12. Yes, made Staff Sergeant through OJT. 
13. Yes, learned a satisfying job. 
14. Yes, because it qualified me for five level quickly. 
15. Yes, because it represents an advancement. 
16 . Yes, because of qualifying me in a satisfying job. 
17. Yes, by qualifying me for a job I like and want to remain in. 
18. Yes, wanted to apply for training in demolition (a scarce 
category) and my squadron commander disapproved. (He is 
now a weapons mechanic, also a scarce job.) 
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ANSWERS TO QUESTION NUMBER THIRTY-FIVE, "ANY OTHER COMMENTS 
ON OJT? I I BY GROUP 
Seven Level, Special Surplus 
1. In the photographic field OJT is possible all the way; 
in the administrative field school should be prerequisite 
with OJT as a follow-up. 
2. The fact that the career field is special surplus is dis-
concerting. 
3. The program is set up by the section; it is completely 
adequate to meet your needs. 
4. OJT has improved since my experience with it. 
5. Would like to see more mock-ups for OJT use. Tech. orders 
on equipment (when equipment isn't obvious or available) 
are not enough for training purposes. I had specialized 
training for depot level work which went down the drain 
because I was never assigned to the job after completion 
of the training. I should have been assigned in the job 
for which I was trained. 
Sa. After a certain level is reached (in experience, pro-
ficiency, and years) there should be no involuntary 
cross-training. Should be no forced cross-training after 
ten years of service. 
6 . OJT has the advantage of training for special and local 
situations which no tech. training can give. 
7. OJT supervisors are often from other career fields or 
same proficiency level. They should be from the same 
career field and a level higher. OJT should be more 
practical, less theoretical. 
8. OJT, for the purpose for which it exists, does not work. 
It is only filling out paper work. Soft core people 
have no incentive because they can't get promoted no 
matter how well they know the job. Hard core people can 
get promotions regardless of how they perform or how 
much they learn ; therefore, they make no attempt to OJT 
their jobs. I have trained as an OJT supervisor of 
training. I recommend that the Air Force study OJT of 
other services and learn how to OJT. 
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9. Could further OJT program by getting professional 
instructors at top of each career field. OJT defeats 
its purpose by requiring a show on paper of training 
performed where no such training was given. I would 
like to see school instructors distributed around the 
Air Force to give OJT. 
10. For this particular job there should be an additional 
shred-out. OJT is a substitute for a training pro-
gram which cannot meet a command's training needs be-
cause of lack of control in the program. It's a 
question of close touch with lower grade airmen which 
OJT does not and cannot accomplis~. 
11. I'm not sufficiently experienced in it to state such 
opinion. I can learn much better on the job than from 
the book. 
12. OJT in the Navy requires an examination by which the 
man either proves himself or fails. In the Air Force 
it's a matter of chart keeping and the man may or may 
not be qualified when the so-called training period is 
ended. Eight out of ten cases, the tests can be 
passed easily if the man has any general knowledge at 
all. 
13. Should abolish the 71, 72, 73, 74, and 75 AFSC's in 
the 641 field and make all of them 64170's. 
14. There is a test for this job, but no manual. Need base 
classrooms for OJT to teach basic fundamentals of each 
career field. There is insufficient time and personnel 
to give classroom instruction. Men left on their own 
do not get sufficient training. 
15. In this field OJT is quite efficient. 
16 . The job description is broader than the job to which 
I'm assigned. Present job is limited to the purely 
mechanical aspects of the job. 
17. I would recommend tech. school in all cases prior to 
OJT. OJT could stand a lot of improvement. 
18. I'm not sufficiently active in a program to give an 
opinion. OJT is obviously better and more necessary in 
other fields. 
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19. vfuere supervisors are civilians, there could be closer 
supervision and better understanding of the program. 
20. Originally OJT in this field was poor because of poor 
supervision. Later assignments have been good on OJT. 
OJT publications are general for beginners, do not 
give sufficient training. 
21. A massage school in Hollywood would help physical condi-
tioning schooling for men in that work. School is now 
utilized by the Air Force. Should be more fully utilized 
for training to the five and seven level so that these 
levels could be qualified as instructors. 
22. There is a three level man in this shop who is supposed 
to be on OJT for heavy weapons equipment; he can't get 
proper training in this assignment. Proficiency tests 
are often outmoded and yet can be the basis of exclusion 
from the career field. For example, radio repairmen 
may have to take (and flunk) tests on equipment they 
haven't worked on since they were in school and which 
is no longer in use. 
22a The facilities on this base are inadequate to get train-
ing which proficiency tests require. Training which 
is required hasn't caught up with modern techniques. 
23. OJT in my career field seems quite adequate. 
24. OJT in my shop is working by the book and working well. 
Five Level, Surplus and Special Surplus 
1. OJT requires proficiency in a much broader field than 
any man can get in a day to day training or experience 
situation -- often tests require knowledge not avail-
able to the trainee. Reece tech lab people are doing 
altogether different work than base labs are, but base 
lab personnel are expected to exhibit proficiency in 
recce tech work. 
2. No comments. Purpose of it is defeated when there is 
no place to go--when goals are withdrawn by freezes and 
surplus and special surplus ratings. 
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3. As long as there. is a need and use of radio operators 
the field shouldn't be frozen. The way it is now rou 
can't get promoted, can't get seven level, and can t 
get retrained until you get seven level. The base 
won't transfer you out so you can get seven level 
training because there is a shortage of radio operators 
on this base. No opportunity to improve your situation. 
No incentive to reenlist. No incentive to get ahead. 
4. OJT has never existed except on paper -- what the NCOIC 
of the shop has to put up with. OJT is necessary ; it 
should be worked out jointly by the local outfit and 
the Air Force. The field covers more than the job 
actually calls for. Not shredded out enough. Should 
be an AFSC for line and another for shop personnel. 
5. I'm working in a job for which there is no AFSC. Not 
in a position to comment because I've never been in a 
formal OJT status, but I have seen people get graded up 
to a five level without ever seeing the equipment on 
'tvhich they're supposed to work . 
6 . OJT in SAC was a good, thorough program. Since I left 
SAC there has been no real program. No one in the 
section reenlists to fill their own vacancies. No 
high vacancies exist in the squadron, no hope for any 
in the future. Men are frozen at the grade and pro-
ficiency level they're in. Hopeless situation. 
7. I would like to see opportunities to advance to seven 
level opened up. A man shouldn't be kept from advanc-
ing because of no seven level authorization or filled 
authorizations. 
8. Recommend that graduates of the seven level school at 
Scott be given the seven level AFSC and shipped PCS 
from the school to fill seven level vacancies. The 
present policy permits assignment not in keeping with 
the ability of the graduates such that much of the 
training is lost through lack of utilization. 
9. No. 
10. The OJT program is wonderful if it is followed, but it 
has never been followed in my experience. TI1ere is an 
increasing amount of duty not related to the job in 
the Air Force. 
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11. I would recommend indoctrination in OJT programs be-
fore leaving tech. school. I would include in OJT 
the odd tasks which are not part of the pro~rams, 
but which require much attention, for example safety 
wiring. 
12. Instead of having one seven level lecturer for the 
program, assign trainees a portion of the course to 
study and then teach to the rest of the men in the 
program. 
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13. Very good training. Without it there would be no pro-
gress in ability to five and seven levels eKcept :furay=ry 
few bright persons. OJT programs should be contin-
uously altered to meet modern changes as they occur. 
Some sections are slipshod about OJT. There should 
be constant pressure to spread good programs through 
all sections. 
lL~. No comment -- two years since I was on OJT. Took OJT 
at Thule AB, Greenland. 
15. Object to being put involuntarily into a job I'm not 
trained for. First enlistment was very discouraging 
in that I was used excessively on details and worked 
practically never at the job for which I was trained. 
16 . There is good OJT in this field in this section. 
17. Object to having been given a blanket AFSC by classi-
fiers. '\~ould, however, prefer to work in a broader 
field than now allowed. My AFSC is normally given 
after ten weeks of tech. training; my tech. training 
was 36 weeks in duration and ~uch · greater in depth. 
tvould prefer an AFSC which would recognize broader 
training and allow broader use of talents. 
18. My experience has included good OJT set-ups -- formal 
and informal -- with tech. rep. instructors. 
19. My experience is to have OJT started and never 
finished -- program slows down and dies. Often OJT 
lacks equipment to use in training and the program 
turns into pure lecture in its worst form. 
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20. Most OJT classes lacked the equipment which was actually 
used on the job. Substituted whatever equipment or 
tech. manuals were available. In one location used 
mostly foreign equipment on which there was very little 
material prepared. 
21. Actually there is no formal course. We learn the j ob 
by working on the equipment. 
22. ~.Jhen several men are OJTing for the same AFSC there 
should be an equitable rotating in the amount of job 
practice. 
23. No suggestion. 
24. I object to people on OJT being limited to the unpleasant 
duties-- they do not learn the whole job that way. It's 
not true in my situation. I rotate all jobs for OJT 
trainees. 
25. OJT works well for this specialty. 
26 . OJT is adequate to meet needs in this field. 
27. TI1e program is pretty fair in my squadron. Considering 
the limitations on facilities the OJT program is good. 
28. For my specialty OJT is not enough. Men in my specialty 
who went to school have more knowledge of theory than I 
have. Tne school at Gunter appears to be a very good 
one. Graduates of the Gunter school, although only three 
levels, can pass the five level tests without difficulty. 
Five Level, Scarce 
1. I have had very satisfactory OJT experiences such that I 
am convinced that the training was much superior to any 
formal t raining on the same subject. This was a unique 
OJT set~ up on one particular base. It was not strictly 
in accordance with the regular program, but much better. 
This was for three years on one base -- not the present 
base. Much of it was largely voluntary and so attracted 
the more serious trainees. 
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I.J. . I think OJT is fine, does a good training job. It could 
be better controlled and supervised. 
5. There should be more of OJT in my career field. 
6 . There is no OJT for cr~to-maintenance; have to set up 
your own. I suspect it s the same Air Force wide. The 
program locally worked out is completely adequate. It 
includes familiarization on equipment not at this base. 
7. OJT in my field is completely adequate. 
8. OJT for this specialty covers so much detailed and 
complicated equipment that a shred-out of this AFSC 
would be desirable. 
9. I would recommend that six months on the line be spent 
in OJT before going to tech. school. Recommend that 
new men from tech. school be taken in tow by an experi-
enced member of the organization and shown all details 
of his job. 
10. OJT depends on how much your particular section depends 
on it. My section was pretty good at it. 
11. I was given special training which present job does not 
utilize. More effort should be made to use people in 
jobs for which they are trained -- at least long enough 
to solidify the training which has been given. There 
should be better attitudes toward men who go out for 
sports; they are now considered " goof balls. 11 
12. Very good in this squadron. 
13. Unit manning requirements have the effect of keeping 
people from OJT. The top is not too badly stopped in 
this squadron; there are some seven level people trans-
ferring out. Lately tech. school trainees are coming 
to the squadron too specialized. They cannot do the 
variety of jobs required in this squadron. Men need 
broader training rather than narrow training. OJT is 
harder for them. 
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14 . OJT does a good job in this career field. 
15. There is an impossible situation on promotions. No 
possibility. If transferred I would have to "tvait a 
minimum time to qualify. I went to tech. traini ng 
after six months on the line. Tech. training after 
that was purely repetition and unnecessary. An ad-
vanced course would have been preferable. 
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16 . OJT is hampered by shortage of openings in the UMD for 
seven levels. 
17. Would like to see tech. training used more for advanced 
courses instead of accenting basic courses. 
18. OJT in this job fits well. 
19 . Completely adequate OJT in my career field. 
20. Books cover too wide a field and not enough detai l in 
the book, but tests have to be answered in detail. Test 
for seven level covers jets ; OJT for same job has nothing 
about jets. 
21. I question whether tests and interviews really reflect 
true ability. 
22. Some time on the job prior to tech. school would make 
tech. school mean more. Would be better prepared for 
first job after tech. school. 
23. A rough career field to have to OJT into; need tech. 
training. 
24. In favor of OJT. In this career field it is very good. 
This type of job is best learned by OJT. Would prefer 
to give a practical demonstration rather than accomplish 
written test. 
25. I would like to get jet training through a tech. school. 
I believe school should be prior to OJT whether training 
is basis or advanced. 
26. Unrealistic program. For example there is a man in the 
shop who is required to train in nuclear weapons for 
which no material is available due to its classification. 
Another man in the shop is supposed to be working on 
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aircraft but is cleaning guns and not getting near 
aircraft. Supposed to be learning a job he's not 
allowed to get near to. 
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